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 This thesis is the culmination of a quest to answer questions about the origins of 
America’s war on drugs.  In 2012 I deployed with the United States Navy aboard U.S.S. 
Elrod (FFG-55) in support of Operation Martillo, a component of the White House 
strategy to combat transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking.  Our Light 
Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK III helicopter detachment embarked with 
the Navy’s first Night Airborne Use of Force (N-AUF) qualified crews.  This 
groundbreaking capability required costly aircrew equipment upgrades, aircraft 
modifications, and months of coordinated training with precision marksmen from the 
U.S. Coast Guard.  The investment in new technology and training justified itself when 
the Elrod and the embarked Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) crew seized 
approximately 9,630 pounds of 100% pure cocaine and 4,938 pounds of marijuana, with 
a total wholesale value of more than $120 million.1  Many of the interdictions included 
arrests of drug traffickers, who were detained aboard the ship and then transferred back to 
the United States for Federal prosecution. 
 While Elrod’s 2012 deployment produced tangible results, I often wondered 
whether or not the actions of one naval warship could really make much of an impact on 
the transnational flow of illegal drugs.  More poignantly, I wondered why the Navy was 
heavily engaged in law enforcement.  When and how did this all start?  Then I read 
historian Paul Gootenberg’s Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug.  This book 
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informed me about early developments of American anti-drug legislation and how 
globalization affected transnational illicit trafficking.  Gootenberg’s monograph also led 
me to ask questions about the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs.2 
 My interest in the history of America’s drug wars swelled when I learned about 
how the nation’s most famous narcotics officer received his coveted Federal Agent 
badge.  This man flew across country, checked into the Washington Hotel under the alias 
“Jon Burrows,” and then hand delivered a six-page letter expressing his motives to a 
guard standing in front of the White House.  He did not wish to be given any title or an 
appointed position.  He wanted more than anything to be a Federal Agent at Large and 
help The Establishment communicate with America’s drug culture, hippie elements, the 
SDS, Black Panthers, etc.  He prepared for service by doing an “in-depth study of drug 
abuse and Communist brainwashing techniques,” and felt “right in the middle of the 
whole thing” where he could do the most good.  He even informed the President of his 
nomination as one of America’s Ten Most Outstanding Men.   
 Jon Burrows’ real name was Elvis Presley.  His sincere letter was forwarded to 
White House deputy assistant to the President on narcotics issues, Bud Krogh, who 
served as one of Nixon’s leaders in the war on drugs and just so happened to be a big 
Elvis fan.  Krogh met the King and was obliged by the Secret Service to accept the 
guest’s gift on behalf of the President, since a chrome-plated WWII commemorative Colt 
.45 set inside a beautiful wooden case—along with seven silver bullets-- was not allowed 
in the Oval Office.  President Nixon’s meeting with the King was cordial.  Elvis 
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personally expressed a desire to give back to his country that had given him so much.  
When told he could receive a Federal Agent at Large badge, Elvis was so overcome with 
excitement that he bear hugged the Commander-In-Chief.3  The day Nixon met Elvis was 
not made public until thirteen months after the meeting took place. 
 This Elvis episode captivated my attention and motivated me to ponder more 
significant historical questions about the drug wars.  By way of contrast, while the 
President hugged the King, he deplored the Beatles.  During the early 1970’s, Nixon’s 
administration denied John Lennon’s visa renewal application and threatened to deport 
him.  Lennon’s violation of drug possession laws served as a justification for this 
decision.  The leader of the Beatles was also a vocal anti-war supporter and surveillance 
target of the FBI. 
 The Elvis-Beatles comparison provides a nice contrast of Nixon’s personal 
perceptions, but other primary source material obtained through the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) contributed more to supporting my thesis 
arguments.  First and foremost, NARA’s U.S. State Department records contained dozens 
of boxes filled with information specifically about narcotics.  I have examined files from 
Record Groups 59 and 273 and discovered detailed accounts about significant drug war 
events and how they affected various foreign countries.  The Digital National Security 
Archive contained thousands of declassified government documents about the 
international origins of Nixon’s war on drugs and was especially helpful in providing 
information about the National Security Council and the drug problems in Vietnam.  The 
NARA II building located in College Park, MD offered access to the CIA Records Search 
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Tool (CREST).  This database enabled me to search thousands of declassified documents 
released by the Central Intelligence Agency.  Many of these papers corroborated what I 
received from the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, which is now located in 
Yorba Linda, CA.  Documents from other various archives also proved helpful and 
informed my understanding of history about the drug wars.  JSTOR contains an ever-
increasing amount of scholarly material and greatly supported my research.  So too did 
ProQuest’s Historical Newspapers database.  Together, these primary sources filled in a 
tapestry, which substantiates the arguments contained in this thesis. 
 I hope this thesis contributes to history’s analysis of the war on drugs.  Richard 
Nixon has long been credited with beginning this so-called war, but this thesis goes 
beyond the typical narrative and examines why the President felt the need to use such 
captivating rhetoric.  In the process of studying the Nixon administration, I found these 
years of American history to be most fascinating.  This is mainly due to the fact that 
Richard Nixon was such a perplexing character, but there is also another reason.  The 
Vietnam War inflicted devastating casualties and divided the American people, but it was 
the war on drugs that escalated during Nixon’s presidency and continued long after he 
was gone.  For this reason, I believe it is historically significant to investigate the genesis 
of the drug wars.  There are many facets to the conflict’s evolution, but this thesis focuses 
on international origins.  In doing so, I wish to show how drug abuse is not just an 
American history problem, but part of a greater global interaction and exchange that has 
involved a long past of transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking.                
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Virtually all historical accounts of President Richard Nixon’s anti-drug initiatives 
have focused on the domestic scene.  Dan Baum’s Smoke and Mirrors and Michael 
Massing’s The Fix contain narrowly focused portions about the significance of drug 
abuse in Vietnam.4  However, these investigative journalists emphasize how the Nixon 
administration developed drug abuse treatment and prevention programs in congruence 
with national anti-drug enforcement legislation.  Historian Jeremy Kuzmarov argues 
reports of an addicted army in Vietnam were a myth and claims drug war scholar David 
F. Musto neglected the reality that Nixon’s drug war was least effective in the 
international realm.5   
In this thesis I argue that Nixon’s drug war developed as a result of very strong 
global influences on America’s concerns about narcotics abuse.  For Nixon, drug abuse 
and addiction was certainly a domestic problem, but it was just as much, if not more so, a 
global issue tied closely with foreign policy.  Nixon held animosity towards the hippie-
drug counterculture and viewed the group as part of a feckless movement manipulated by 
foreign communist interests.  In a backlash, Nixon supported total efforts to reduce both 
the supply and demand of illegal drugs.  This comprehensive approach was the initial 
strategy early in his administration but then evolved over time as key players changed 
and the mess of corruption and scandal took its toll leading to the President’s resignation 
in 1974. 
                                                
4	  Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1996). 
Michael Massing, The Fix (Berkley: University of California Press, 1998). 
5 Jeremy Kuzmarov, The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 120. 
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Most Americans immediately associate Richard Nixon with Watergate,6 although 
many historians grant him credit for some significant progressive domestic programs and 
for his achievements in foreign policy.7  However from Nixon’s point of view, one of the 
initiatives that meant most to him in the long run was the global war on drugs and a 
sincere desire to confront drug abuse.  Nixon’s later memoirs, including Beyond Peace 
published the year of his death in 1994,8 provide evidence of his keen interest in 
America’s drug problem.  However, one might hardly notice this by simply examining 
works he published during the years immediately after he left office, when he was still 
quite bitter about Watergate and his resignation.  
Looking back after a significant change over time, one can see that the Nixon 
Presidency was a catalyst for the modern war on drugs.  During the days of his 
administration efforts to confront drug abuse and illicit trafficking grew substantially and 
continued to expand well after Richard Nixon left office.  In the immediate aftermath of 
his infamous resignation, most people thought the former president’s legacy would be 
dominated by ignominious details about the Watergate scandal.  While America 
overcame the fallout of Watergate, the remnants of Nixon’s drug war remain prominent 
in today’s global fight against substance abuse and drug addiction.  All the President’s 
men associated with the Watergate Scandal have now been released from jail or have 
passed away, yet America perplexingly incarcerates the highest numbers of prisoners in 
the world, most of whom are in jail because of some kind of drug-related offense.   
                                                
6Michael Schudson’s,Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the 
Past (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 
7 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York, Basic Books, 1994). 
8 Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House, 1994). 
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Strategic international partnerships were key in combating foreign influences in 
the global war on drugs.  On June 17, 1971, President Nixon delivered a special message 
to the United States Congress on drug abuse prevention and control.  “To wage an 
effective war against heroin addiction,” he said, “America must have international 
cooperation.”9  This day in history has come to be commonly known as the beginning of 
America’s so called “War On Drugs.”  However, prior to 1971 the Nixon Administration 
made significant attempts to promote international narcotics control.  In Turkey, the 
Nixon Administration encouraged an opium poppy growing ban along with crop 
substitution initiatives.  Meanwhile in France, officials were urged to cooperate with 
international efforts to break up heroin smuggling syndicates.  Nixon also approved 
actions to affect illegal Mexican drug trafficking, including the granting of foreign aid in 
the form of manpower and military equipment and initiatives such as Operation Intercept, 
which was a short-lived effort to more thoroughly check vehicles crossing the border into 
the United States.  These three strategic international partnerships did not develop easily 
but rather required tremendous effort and patience on the part of diplomats and key 





      
                                                
9  Richard Nixon: "Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control," June 17, 
1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  Accessed 
January 10, 2013.  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048 
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Chapter 2: Prelude to War 
Phases of American Hysteria Preceded Nixon’s Drug War 
Nixon’s attitude toward the counterculture was informed by concerns about 
foreign influences on citizens of the United States.  This was not the first time in 
American history when foreign influences stirred up objective hysteria.  In this section I 
review anti-drug enforcement laws prior to Nixon’s inauguration in 1969 to show a series 
of phases or episodes that were – in every case – animated by concerns over foreign 
influences.  This is not just a domestic story; it is a narrative about American laws 
animated by American immigrants and anxieties about foreigners. 
Phase 1: Chinese-American Immigrants and Opium   
 
The antecedents of America’s 1970s anti-drug war trace all the way back to the 
Opium Wars, when Chinese officials took action against an imperialist instrument of 
wealth and conflict.  In the early 19th century, Britain solved a trade imbalance with 
Asian partners by producing opium in India and promoting its sale to China.  The 
Chinese were already acquainted with the drug.  Opium sold so well in China that, by the 
1830s, the British deficit had been replaced by a trade surplus in the form of a large 
drainage of silver out of China.  Alarmed by the financial loss and morally outraged by 
the rapid spread of opium addiction, the Manchu dynasty, which ruled China at the time, 
determined to cut off opium imports. In 1839, Imperial Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu 
burned 20,283 chests of opium belonging to foreign firms in the Canton area, and later 
captured twenty-three boats used by foreigners to smuggle opium into China.  The 
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seizure and burning of seized commodities belonging to British traders in the Canton 
region set off the Opium War of 1839-1842.10 
An environment of chaos and despair developed as a result of the Opium War and 
pushed many Chinese emigrants, along with their knowledge and affection for opiates, to 
faraway places like California.11  Gold rush boomtowns provided countless opportunities 
for newcomers seeking wage labor and riches.  Ambitious Asians quickly gained footing 
in their evolving communities through the networking and self-policing of influential 
Chinese associations.  These connections proved to be a significant resource for assisting 
industrious workers and consummate business proprietors, but they also led to suspicion 
from outsiders.  Differences in appearance, speech, and other cultural practices including 
eating habits fostered growing animosity towards Chinese immigrants.12   
As ethnic biases grew stronger and opium dens became more and more accessible 
to Californians, local governments began to act.  The Mayor of San Francisco 
recommended action against opium dens, and on November 15, 1875, the city’s Board of 
Supervisors passed an ordinance to prohibit their operation within town limits.13  
Scholars like Stephen A. Maisto, Mark Galizio, and Gerard Joseph Connors have come to 
consider this law as America’s first anti-drug legislation.14  The San Francisco Chronicle 
asserted that the measure was passed to prevent young white men and women of 
respectable parentage and business avocations from inhaling the fumes from the opium 
                                                
10 Director of Intelligence, “China and International Narcotics Control,” Secret Weekly Summary Special 
Report, Approved For Release 2007/10/23, (Langley: CIA, June 23, 1972) 2-3.    
11 H.W. Brands, The Age of Gold: The California Gold Rush and the New American Dream (New York: 
Random House Books, 2002) 62-64. 
12 Brands, Age of Gold,330-334. 
13 “The Opium Dens.” (1875, Nov 16). San Francisco Chronicle (1869-Current File). Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/357194860?accountid=14696 
14 Stephen A. Maisto, Mark Galizio, Gerard Joseph Connors, Drug Use and Abuse, Sixth Edition (Belmont: 
Wadsworth, 2010), 33. 
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pipes until a state of stupefaction is produced.15  While the law placated a public majority 
concerned about protecting the welfare of white men and women, the ordinance was first 
and foremost a reflection of anti-Chinese hysteria and the disdain for opium den 
operators.16 
In the same period, other areas with significant Chinese immigrant populations 
passed similar laws to those approved in the city of San Francisco.  Oakland, Sacramento, 
Stockton, and Virginia City all passed legislation to curtail the operation of Chinese 
opium dens.  Nevada's 1877 law was the first to actually prohibit opium smoking.  Not 
only were places for illegally using opium prohibited, but selling or dispensing opium 
without a physician’s prescription also became a crime.   
Other western states followed suit.  In 1881, the California State Legislature 
enacted a statewide ban of its own by acting to amend a vague, ineffective penal code 
that had been passed less than a decade before.  Under the new law, various opium-
associated actions in commercial establishments would be prosecuted as misdemeanors 
under a section reserved for crimes against religion, conscience, and good morals.17  Just 
as other anti-Asian ordinances were passed to target perceived problems associated with 
immigration, early anti-substance legislation in the United States was by and large a 
reaction to public hysteria against Chinese immigrants and sought to make this aspect of 
the lifestyle of the West Coast's Chinese lifestyle "devilishly uncomfortable."18 
                                                
15 “The Opium Dens.” (1875, Nov 16). San Francisco Chronicle (1869-Current File). Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/357194860?accountid=14696 
16 See Kathleen Auerhahn, “The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug  
Legislation in the United States,” Law and Social Inquiry 24 (Spring 1999): 411, 417.  
17 For an in-depth look at the creation of opium laws and their close ties to the anti-Chinese  
movement, see Diana L. Ahmad, The Opium Debate and Chinese Exclusion Laws in  
the Nineteenth-Century American West (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007), 59-62. 
18 Mikelis Beitiks, “Devilishly Uncomfortable: In the Matter of Sic,” California Legal History Journal, 
Volume 6, 2011, 238-244. This article was the winning entry in the California Supreme Court Historical 
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American domestic fears about the effects of foreign opium prompted support for 
federal anti-drug legislation.  While studying a full transnational history of the drug trade 
must include China’s mid-nineteenth century Opium War, subsequent chaos, and its 
effects on American state laws, the Federal concern about narcotics in the United States 
originated during the beginning of the twentieth century.  On February 9, 1909, the U. S. 
Congress passed an act (35 Stat. 614) to prohibit the importation of opium except for 
medicinal use.19  During the same period when U.S. lawmakers were deliberating on 
domestic legislation to curb the spread of harmful narcotics, the International Opium 
Commission convened in Shanghai and recommended a future conference to consider 
unified controls of the international opium trade.  On December 11, 1911, representatives 
from around the globe assembled at The Hague to hold the first International Opium 
Convention.  The concluding recommendation from this summit included a prohibition 
on the export of opium to countries that excluded its entry as well as domestic legislation 
to control the production and use of the narcotic within national boundaries.   
The United States was ahead of the rest of the world in anti-drug legislation and 
has been the leader of global anti-drug efforts ever since.  Anxieties about foreign 
influences on American citizens moved government officials to action.  On January 17, 
1914 – three years after the first International Opium Convention Congress approved 
additional laws to regulate opium -- the U.S. Congress passed two pieces of anti-drug 
legislation.  The first act (38 Stat. 275) regulated the importation of opium and banned 
the exportation of smoking opium.  Americans would only be allowed to export opium 
                                                                                                                                            
Society’s 2011 Student Writing Competition and provides great insight to the California Supreme Court’s 
strike at balancing race, drugs, and government during the 1880s. 
19 Forrest R. Holdcamper, Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Narcotics, Record Group 
170 (College Park, MD: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 1964), NO-50. 
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and cocaine to countries who closely regulated the commodities’ entry and could control 
extent of its usage.  The second act (38 Stat. 277) authorized sharp increases on duty fees.  
The opium tax was increased from $10 to $300 a pound and raised the bond required of 
manufacturers from $5,000 to not less than $100,000.  And in late 1914 Congress passed 
the Harrison Act (38 Stat. 277).  This law became effective on March 1 the following 
year and placed even more specific constraints on the domestic use of opium, coca, and 
its derivatives.  The act restricted the legal trade of opium to people authorized and 
registered with the federal government.  It also imposed a special annual tax in order to 
maintain the right to hold such credentials.  The most significant part of the new law was 
that the Commissioner of United States’ Internal Revenue Service was delegated 
responsibility for its enforcement.   
Additional government agencies were created to deal with the problems caused by 
narcotics and illicit drug trafficking.  The Treasury Department took ownership of 
America’s earliest narcotics control efforts.  Additional resources were granted to the 
Department when Congress approved an act (46 Stat. 585) on June 14, 1930, to establish 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN).  This law transferred the functions and records of 
two existing agencies.  One was the Federal Narcotics and Control Board, which 
consisted of Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce, who collectively held 
authority to “make and publish all proper regulations” for the enforcement of the 
prohibition of the importation and exportation of certain narcotics.20  The other was the 
Narcotic Division of the Bureau of Prohibition, which the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue had already controlled since the passage of the Harrison Act. 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
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The FBN would become a zealous organization determined to carry out its chief 
functions to prevent illicit traffic in drugs and to control the legitimate manufacture and 
distribution of narcotics for medicinal purposes.  Special Agents from the FBN worked 
closely with the Bureau of Customs, Public Health and Service, the State Department, 
and several state government officials in order to pursue the agency’s activities.  From 
the public nuisance of opium dens in California to Congressionally enacted legislation 
that promoted international cooperation and new federal agencies, the foreign influence 
of Chinese immigrants and their perceived connection to narcotics trafficking was the 
first phase of American hysteria towards dangerous drugs. 
Phase 2: Mexican-American Immigrants and Marijuana 
 
 The second major phase of foreign hysteria in regards to concerns about 
dangerous drugs occurred during the 1920s-1930s.  In this case, again, foreigners were 
central:  Mexican immigrants and the perceived danger of marijuana.  Just as the Opium 
Wars created a situation of turmoil and unrest in China throughout the mid nineteenth 
century, the 1910-1920 Mexican Revolution fostered similar upheaval and pushed 
thousands of displaced and downtrodden people North of the border.  A significant 
increase in Mexican immigration to the United States challenged the U.S. status quo, and 
a strong backlash led to racial discrimination.  Most significant for the history of 
America’s interest in anti-drug policies was that the fact that the influx of foreigners 
during this era contributed to the 1930s movement towards criminalization of marijuana.   
 The influence of revolutionary and post-revolutionary Mexican immigrants 
changed American society in many ways.  The first was in the realm of labor practices.  
As Mexican Americans acclimated to their new country, many continued to hold on to 
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revolutionary ideas and tactics brought from the South.  When the Great Depression 
struck, the political and economic climate of the following decade provided conditions 
for strikes and rebellion, especially in the U.S. Southwest, where mining, agriculture, and 
food-processing industries relied upon compliant transient labor.  Mexican culture was 
another facet of U.S. diversification.  Despite a depressing decline in job opportunities 
after 1929 and an environment of competition due to increasing numbers of workers 
seeking employment, native-born Americans developed an enormous “vogue” for many 
“things Mexican,” particularly folk performance traditions such as music, costume, and 
dance; handicrafts and murals; and all kinds of romantic, pastoral representations of rural 
Mexican life.21  Political law and social order was a third element influenced by the 
effects of Mexico’s revolution and ensuing exodus.  The growing flood of Mexican 
immigrants prompted local and state authorities to request additional resources they 
believed were needed to bolster police authority and enhance border control.  State 
officials also began to discuss new forms of citizenship that would adapt to changes in 
the traditional American mosaic. 
 While the effects of Mexican immigration diversified life experiences in the 
United States, many conservatives feared these changes challenged and eroded traditional 
American values.  Anticommunist and anti-drug rhetoric grew in volume and frequency 
in order to prevent the Mexican revolution from spreading north.  Taken together, 
Mexican influences amounted to a level of grave concern for conservative authorities 
who held influential positions within some of the nation’s most powerful government 
organizations. 
                                                
21 Helen Delpar, The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relationships between the United 
States and Mexico, 1920-1935 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), in Curtis Marez, Drug 
Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 106. 
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The FBN and Harry Anslinger: America’s First Drug Czar  
 
 It was in this environment of Mexican xenophobia that America’s first drug czar 
responded to anxieties held by many U.S. citizens and moved to elevate the prominence 
and effectiveness of the young Federal Bureau of Narcotics.  On August 12, 1930, 
President Herbert Hoover appointed Harry Jacob Anslinger (May 20, 1892-November 14, 
1975) to serve as the FBN’s first Chief.  At that time his bureau was but a small agency 
within the U.S. Treasury Department, but over the next three decades Anslinger, more 
than any other individual before Richard Nixon, exerted great influence over federal drug 
policy that stretched beyond domestic narcotics enforcement.22  
  Like Nixon, Commissioner Anslinger capitalized on an environment full of 
growing disdain towards foreign influences and sought to leverage his authority against 
the country’s perceived enemy threats.  Mexican xenophobia and worries about the new 
substance of the day known as cannabis or “marijuana” provided the perfect target for the 
FBN to expand and gain national attention.  Before the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was 
created in 1930, enforcement efforts had comparatively little effect in curbing illicit 
traffic.  Detecting and preventing unlawful importation of illegal substances was the 
major enforcement problem then, just as it would become more and more in the future.  
Commissioner Anslinger realized this and reasoned correctly that the main factors 
creating an abundant supply for drug addicts in the United States were foreign 
overproduction and low prices. 
 Anslinger advocated an international, interstate effort to go after drug syndicates 
and smuggling activities.  Rather than clean up old opium dens in city slums, Anslinger 
                                                
22 John C. McWilliams, The Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1930-
1962, (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 45. 
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let the work of catching individual peddlers and addicts fall upon local police 
departments.  Instead, he led his agents to achieve a high level of proficiency in breaking 
up international narcotics trafficking rings and drug runners.23  From 1930 to1937, he led 
an intense campaign to outlaw cannabis and enforce the control of marijuana.  This 
crusade gained momentum in large part due to the way marijuana was most commonly 
associated with indolent Mexican laborers in the southwestern states, perceived as 
nefarious criminal types by most citizens living in the rest of the nation.  Mexican 
workers were commonly thought of as knife brandishing ruffians with a proclivity for 
drunkenness and disorderly conduct.  Such tales -- greatly exaggerated if not totally 
erroneous -- fostered the general stereotype of marijuana-smoking Mexicans committing 
violent acts.  Still, many immigrants did in fact bring cannabis with them as they made 
their way north to cross the Rio Grande and accepted low-paying jobs in the fields from 
Texas to California.  However, the drug was a relatively isolated problem, and the nation 
was generally indifferent to its existence, except in places like Los Angeles, with its 
highly concentrated Mexican-American populations.24 
 Hysteria about foreign stereotypes prompted officials in power to act.  Labor 
dispute issues, combined with an increased cultural awareness of Mexican marijuana 
through Hollywood motion pictures, songs, and dance, continued to fuel suspicions of 
foreign influences and led to the emergence of cannabis gaining the reputation of being 
the “killer weed.”  Just as high crime rates in Washington, DC, inspired the Nixon 
Administration to look at the heroin problem during the 1970s, officials from the city of 
                                                
23 Harry J. Anslinger, “Narcotic Agent Lectures Here,” from the Dickinsonian, December 15, 1932, 
Anslinger Papers, box 6, file “Scrapbook 11-B, March 1930-December 1933.”  Pattee Library Special 
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New Orleans called for federal legislation to address drug-related criminal activities as 
early as the 1930s.  At that time, marijuana drew attention as a crime-producing drug 
associated with sharp rises in illegal activities.   
The anti-crime, anti-drug initiatives were supported by government officials and 
were spearheaded by expert physicians, as in Nixon’s program four decades later.  In 
1931, Dr. A. E. Fossier delivered a paper titled “The Marijuana Menace” to Louisiana’s 
State Medical Society.  His remarks opened with an account about a sect of military and 
religious assassins in Persia, that in 1090 A.D. “committed secret murders in blind 
obedience to the chief after becoming intoxicated with hashish.”25  This example would 
be later connected to physicians’ claims that marijuana in large doses produces, 
“excitement, delusions, hallucinations… with a tendency to willful damage and 
violence.”26  Word about the dangers of cannabis began to spread across the nation.  For 
instance, the New York Times published a story in 1933 about the bust of a “Dope Ring 
Specialized in Mexican Marijuana.”  According to the article, the weed is referred to as 
“hay” in the vernacular and is “highly intoxicating and constitutes an ever recurring 
problem where there are Mexicans or Spanish-Americans of lower classes.”27  By the 
mid-1930s the “marijuana menace” was headlining in national newspapers and 
magazines.  The weed was reportedly being grown along roadways, in city backyards and 
vacant lots, and even in the fields of federal penitentiaries by ingenious inmates.  
                                                
25 A.E. Fossier, “The Marihuanna Menace,” New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 84 (1931): 247. 
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 As we will see with Nixon’s war on drugs, federal law enforcement agents and 
government officials remained placated by modest efforts to combat the drug problem 
until some kind of catalyst pushed the issue to higher priority levels.  When marijuana 
began to spread into the Midwestern and northern regions of the United States and 
became associated with the nation’s young people, public awareness grew and many 
Americans no longer were willing to ascribe the drug to Mexicans and illegal aliens in 
the Southwest.  Anslinger led his narcotics agents in a national crusade against a drug 
whose properties had been hyped up with more fear than biological understanding.  To 
them, marijuana was more degenerating and corrupting to a person’s character than 
opium, making it the most dangerous of the commonly abused drugs.  Anslinger 
described the marijuana menace to the Women’s National Exposition of Arts and 
Industry by saying, “Take all of the good in Dr. Jekyll and the worst in Mr. Hyde—the 
result is opium.”  This is not so with marijuana, he continued.  “Its importance in the 
Pharmacopeia is not intrinsically indispensable.  Marijuana may be considered more 
harmful in its potentialities for evil than its limited advantages for medical or commercial 
purposes.  It is Mr. Hyde alone.”28  To substantiate Anslinger’s claim, one of his agents 
subsequently publicized the case of a man who decapitated his friend with an ax but was 
unable to remember the episode just a few hours later.29  News about such cases 
perpetuated the fear and stigma associated with the FBN’s targeted drug and alarmed the 
public to the point where more and more people supported federal action. 
 Commissioner Anslinger never seemed to back down from widely accepted 
myths about Mexican influences on the marijuana drug problem.  During congressional 
                                                
28 Ibid, 51. 
29 Wooster Taylor, “Economy Cut Ties Hands of ‘Dope Agents,” Washington Herald, November 7, 1933, 
Anslinger Papers, Box 1, file “Articles on Narcotics 1930-1937.” 
 
 15  
hearings, Anslinger presented horrific true stories to support his case against the 
influence of ethnic foreigners and minorities.  Colorado news editor Floyd Baskette saw 
the marijuana problem as a Mexican one when he declared, “I wish I could show you 
what a small marihuana cigarette does to one of our degenerate Spanish speaking 
residents.  That’s why our problem is so great,” he said, adding racist embellishments.  
“The greatest percentage of our population is composed of Spanish speaking persons, 
most of whom are low mentally, because of social and racial conditions.30  One case in 
particular that served Anslinger’s agenda well was the marijuana-induced multiple 
murder case of Victor Licata, a young Mexican charged with slaughtering his family in 
Florida while under the influence of a marijuana “dream.”31  Anslinger had a special 
ability to protect the interests of his agency by charming listeners with astonishing stories 
that reaffirmed widely accepted myths. 
 Like Nixon, Commissioner Anslinger masterfully pushed his agenda forward by 
fervently moving legislation through the law making process.  When the 1914 Harrison 
Act proved to be insufficient for confronting weed drugs like cannabis, Anslinger worked 
with representatives from the Treasury Department to support the passage of The 
Marijuana Tax Act.  Congress convened weeks of committee hearings and testimony 
during the spring of 1937, and finally produced a bill ready for President Roosevelt’s 
signature.  Its passage was by and large due to the convincing testimony and behind-the-
scenes work of Harry Anslinger and his allies.  Although the provisions of the 1937 
Marijuana Tax Act were not really designed to raise revenue or even regulate the use of 
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weed drugs, the law provided legal mechanisms for the Commissioner of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics and U.S. government law officials to enforce their prohibition.  In 
these and other ways, Anslinger used the catalyst of social anxieties and cultural 
conditions brought about by the myths of Mexican immigrants and their pernicious weeds 
to facilitate Congressional approval for anti-drug laws, while simultaneously 
strengthening the scope and authority of the FBN. 
 Harry J. Anslinger was America’s first drug czar and served as Commissioner of 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for an unprecedented thirty-two years until 1962.  He 
then held office two years as US Representative to the United Nations Narcotics 
Commission.  The responsibilities once held by Anslinger would be assumed by special 
appointees during the Nixon administration and are now largely under the jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy. 
Phase 3: Communist Anxieties and Heroin 
 
 After World War II, public opinion and Communist paranoia continued to 
influence the development of American anti-drug laws.  When heroin use rose during the 
early 1950s, Federal Bureau of Narcotics’ Commissioner Harry Anslinger reacted by 
harnessing public sentiments and advocating for increased penalties to be imposed upon 
drug law offenders.  In 1951, The Boggs Act32 passed to amend current penalty 
provisions applicable to any person convicted of violating specific narcotics laws and 
established mandatory minimum sentences for future criminals. 
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 Support for such measures extended beyond narcotics control agents.  For 
example, Anslinger credited prominent Americans like Democrat Congressman Hale 
Boggs of Louisiana and Mrs. Elizabeth Hamilton Wright, for being leaders in the field of 
national and international narcotics control.33  After Wright suffered a stroke in 1952, 
Anslinger told the New York Times that, “The pre-eminence and unflagging zeal will 
make her loss in the fight against narcotic drugs irreplaceable,” and added that, “Mrs. 
Wright was among those directly responsible for the Boggs Act, recently passed by 
Congress, which places heavy penalties on anyone found guilty of peddling narcotics.”34 
 Just as Nixon’s drug war would two decades later, 1950’s anti-drug legislation 
tied domestic issues closely to foreign affairs.  After President Truman signed The Boggs 
Act into effect in 1952, Commissioner Harry Anslinger directed a nation-wide dawn to 
dusk series of narcotics raids during which United States agents seized nearly 500 
suspected drug peddlers known to have targeted juvenile addicts.  Anslinger said the 
crackdown was geared to a drive abroad to close down the large sources for narcotics 
being sent to the United States, particularly from Italy.  The FBN commissioner publicly 
praised the Italian secret police for doing “a magnificent job” in stopping the flow of 
heroin to the U.S. and for investigating former vice lord Charles (Lucky) Luciano.35 
 As the Cold War heated up, fear of communist infiltration penetrated nearly every 
facet of government and society, and the role of narcotics and dangerous drugs played no 
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small part.  After two decades of building up the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 
soliciting domestic and international support, Harry Anslinger began to run into strong 
opposition.  Rumors of corruption within the FBN began to surface, along with 
objections to questionable polices and organizational practices.  Despite draconian penal 
laws enacted through the Commissioner’s guidance, drug use seemed to be on the rise 
with no reliable tracking methods or reliable statistics to substantiate the Bureau’s work.  
During the same time Anslinger was also losing his ability to direct counter narcotic 
efforts abroad.   
 In this defensive climate the Commissioner launched a campaign to re-invigorate 
the stature of his besieged agency by using social and political hysteria about 
communism to his advantage.  For example, Anslinger used television to educate the 
public about the dangers of Communist Red China pushing highly pure and potent 
narcotics into the black market as a means to cut the fabric of strong American values.  
During an interview just prior to United Nations’ international narcotics meetings the 
Chronoscope, a program produced in New York by the Columbia Broadcasting System, 
featured Anslinger claiming that, “According to all the documents we have been 
examining today, the major source [of narcotics] is Red Communist China.”36   Anslinger 
elaborated on the threat of China by postulating the Soviets’ interest in illicit trafficking 
was for repaying debts owed to the Soviet Union in U.S. dollars.  Anslinger added that 
the fact they were also poisoning America’s youth seemed to matter little in Mao’s 
regime.  What is most striking about the Chronoscope interview is the way in which the 
journalists repeatedly inquire about Communist China’s motives in trafficking illegal 
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narcotics.  Although Anslinger attempts to explain that China’s motives are financially 
driven, the interviewers’ persistence reflects conventional wisdom of the early 1950s that 
Communists were using illegal drugs like a weapon comparable to espionage or military 
might.  Anslinger did not indefatigably disagree, but used the common myth to his 
advantage by describing how China supports the export of a poison.  This is just one of 
many examples of how Commissioner Anslinger astutely played off of public opinion to 
support the relevance and stature of his bureau.37 
 Fear of Communist foreign influences continued to fuel America’s interest in 
anti-drug policies.  By 1955 the idea of being over-run by communists wielding 
hypodermic needles rather than rifles had become a major concern to politicians in 
Washington.38  Seven members of Congress spoke on the House Chamber floor in 1954 
about the evils of communism and either cited Anslinger directly or included articles 
written by the Commissioner.  One of them, Congressman Fred E. Busbey of Illinois, felt 
that even the long sentences provided for in the Boggs Act were insufficient for 
communist-supplied dope peddlers who were poisoning America’s juvenile population.  
To get “at the very heart of the whole treacherous narcotics problem” Congressman 
Busbey introduced House Resolution 8700, which would make the death penalty or life 
imprisonment mandatory for anyone convicted of selling narcotics to persons under 
twenty-one years old.39  While H.R. 8700 failed to reach a vote in 1954, the U.S. Senate 
did pass a resolution to authorize the first nationwide investigation of the illicit narcotics 
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traffic, drug addiction, and the treatment of drug addicts, with the objective of improving 
the Federal Criminal Code and enforcement procedures dealing with marijuana and other 
harmful drugs.   
 Five years after the Boggs Bill passed, months of testimony and Senate hearings 
culminated in a congressional review that led to the passage of the Narcotic Control Act 
of 1956.  This new legislation amended U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 
the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act to provide even more effective measures in 
restricting narcotic drugs and marijuana.  The new laws lengthened minimum sentences 
and allowed imposition of the death penalty on anyone over eighteen years old who 
provided heroin to underage juveniles.  Another section of the act required that all those 
still legally in possession of heroin, including legitimate distributors like pharmacists, 
turn their inventory over to authorities.  From then on, the American Government 
considered heroin a national contraband narcotic.40  
 Commissioner Harry Anslinger was a fervent crusader for international narcotics 
control and contributed more than any other individual to influence America’s interest in 
anti-drug law enforcement prior to the Nixon Administration.  In addition to promoting 
harsh punishment for illegal drug abusers and traffickers, Anslinger worked to expand the 
size and authority of the Federal Narcotics Bureau.  The Narcotic Control Act of 1956 he 
supported not only doubled maximum fines and mandatory sentencing provided by the 
Boggs Act, but it also contained provisions which greatly expanded anti-drug law 
enforcement activities.  The bill granted U.S. Customs Bureau and FBN officers authority 
to carry firearms, service search warrants, and make arrests without judicial approval for 
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“violations committed in their presence.”41  Funding to organize a federal agent training 
school was allocated, and special permission was granted to intercept telephone calls 
between suspected narcotics traffickers.   
 Most significantly the new legislation enabled Anslinger to declare an all-out war 
against heroin, which he said was coming primarily from Communist China, Turkey, 
Syria, Lebanon, France, Italy, and Mexico.  In 1959 he reported to Congress that heavier 
mandatory jail sentences combined with international narcotics control efforts had led to 
a decline in the number of drug addicts.  However, the Commissioner insisted most of the 
West Coast supply of heroin continues to flow from Communist Red China by way of 
Hong Kong.  By way of illustration, Mr. Anslinger told Congress that the bureau in 
January of 1959 obtained indictments in San Francisco of thirty people believed to be 
“part of the Communist conspiracy.”  The Commissioner explained, “These fellows that 
we picked up, the correspondence indicated they were calling each other ‘comrade’ and it 
undoubtedly was a communist heroin ring.  This case involved at least 270 pounds of 
heroin brought into the United States from Communist China over a period of several 
years, a very substantial operation.”42  By continuing to associate communism with 
international narcotics control, Anslinger proved effective at using public hysteria about 
foreign influences to promote anti-drug law enforcement interests. 
 Public hysteria generated by fears of foreign communist influences may have 
contributed to the passage of strict punishments for anti-narcotics law violators, but such 
callous measures seem to have had little effect on the overall drug problem.  By the time 
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Nixon’s drug war was in full swing in 1973, no one had been executed under the 1956 
Narcotic Control Act.  According to a Washington lawyer named Rufus King, who’s 
book The Drug Hangup surveys addiction in the twentieth century, several Federal judges 
refused outright to impose the mandatory sentences dictated by the 1956 statute.  Juries 
often returned “not guilty” verdicts because the punishment did not seem to fit the crime 
and many courts became clogged, because plea-bargaining was not permitted.43  In 1962 
President Kennedy unobtrusively pardoned dozens who had been sentenced under the 
1956 act.  This precedent can be argued to have dampened much of the deterrent effect 
punitive mandatory sentencing laws were intended to have when passed by the Congress. 
 The policies of John F. Kennedy relieved some of the draconian effects of these 
laws and led to a decline of Harry Anslinger’s influence after three decades of political 
and popular support.  In 1962, Commissioner Anslinger resigned from the FBN and a 
Conference on Drug Abuse to reevaluate America’s drug policies was hosted at the 
White House.  As a result, the Presidential Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse was 
established and an initial report was published the following year.  Recommendations 
included relaxation of mandatory minimum sentences, increased appropriation for drug 
abuse research, and the dismantling of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics along with a 
transfer of many of its functions to the Justice and Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
departments.  The HEW Department would assume responsibility for legitimate 
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distribution and research, while Justice would be given the mission of investigating and 
reducing illicit traffic.44   
 After resigning as head of the FBN, Anslinger served as United States’ 
Representative to the United Nations Narcotics Commission for two years after which he 
retired.  His days of fighting foreign influences and emphasizing international narcotics 
control came to a winter’s end, and the medical profession emerged as an authoritative 
voice in saying what constitutes legitimate use of narcotics and treatment of drug abuse in 
regards to national drug policies.  
Phase 4: Backlash to the 1960s Counterculture Movement 
 
 During the late 1960s, a new season of public hysteria commenced with a 
backlash to the significant counterculture movement.  Suspected communist influences 
on United States’ society extended beyond drug peddling to the manipulation of a rising 
generation of America’s youth.  Conservatives like Richard Nixon viewed the 1960’s 
counterculture movement, which included peace loving, drug-using hippies and far more 
radical activist groups, as anti-American.  Nixon championed the voice of America’s 
“silent majority,” which he believed was united in identifying the counterculture 
movement as a leading cause for the nation’s decay and declining ability to overcome 
foreign influences like communism.    
 U.S. Government leaders made attempts to respond to changes in American 
society throughout the late 1960s, but these measures generally lacked an international 
focus.  Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 passed to protect the public health and 
safety by changing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to establish the Bureau of 
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Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) within HEW Department for restricting depressant, 
stimulant, and counterfeit drugs.45  In 1966, the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act 
(NARA) provided that addicts charged with violating Federal laws could opt for 
treatment under the care of the U.S. Surgeon General, with charges being held in 
abeyance, to be dropped if improvement was shown within three years of commencing a 
structured rehabilitation program.46   
 The national narcotic problem was examined again in 1967.  Despite a litany of 
new laws, drug use had become representative of protest and social rebellion during the 
era’s atmosphere of political unrest.  On January 14, San Francisco’s Golden Gate Park 
filled with twenty thousand gyrating young raggedly clothed meanderers who flocked 
together to share poetry, chant mantras, and listen to psychedelic bands like Moby Grape 
and the Jefferson Airplane.47  Illegal barbiturates like LSD were distributed and passed 
around like candy, and the emerging hippie movement was on its way to becoming a 
precursor to militant anti-war opposition that would derail Lyndon Johnson’s ambitions 
for a second term and nearly destruct Nixon’s Vietnam War exit strategy (known as 
Vietnamization).  As a result of the hippie movement, social stigmatization previously 
associated with drugs lessened and abuse became a more mainstream part of life. 
 President Johnson reacted to the counterculture movement by calling on the 
nation’s government to act and approve international narcotics control efforts.  In a 
special message sent to Congress on February 6 about crime in the United States, 
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Johnson devoted a small portion to advocating the control of dangerous drugs.  “If we are 
to succeed in controlling narcotics and dangerous drugs,” he said, “we must work in 
concert with other nations.  Most illicit narcotics –particularly heroin—come from and 
through other nations to our shores.  Drugs, like epidemic diseases, must be controlled 
effectively everywhere.”48  Ironically, the emphasis of anti-drug efforts at this time was 
not on substances known to be widely proliferated among hippie groups like marijuana or 
LSD, but instead on opium and heroin.  
 One of the most overlooked and underrated contributions to the origins of Nixon’s 
drug war was ratification of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.  A month 
after urging congressional support for his anti-crime bill, President Johnson requested the 
Senate’s approval for United States accession to the UN sponsored treaty.  The 1961 
Single Convention was designed to accomplish several objectives: combine nine other 
international agreements on narcotics dating all the way back to 1912, reduce the number 
of agencies controlling drug traffic, and provide control over the production of raw 
materials needed in order to produce narcotic drugs.  In addition to consolidating earlier 
agreements, the convention established a single international narcotics control board, 
with permanent headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.  The United States was now ready 
to join fifty-four other countries in ratifying a new international law against drugs, despite 
spending over seven years debating whether or not to do so.49  Although the United States 
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instigated the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the Senate finally ratified the 
measure under Johnson’s watch.  The International law provided a cornerstone to the 
international control system by obliging signatory nations to limit certain drug 
production, eradicate unlicensed cultivation, suppress illicit trafficking, and co-operate 
with other nations in order to achieve the treaty’s aims and objectives.50  In the spring of 
1967 however, little fanfare or publicity was given to final Congressional approval.  The 
New York Times, for instance, did not even find its passage headline worthy for its 
periodical.  Little did publishers know that Richard Nixon’s international approach to 
narcotics control would rely heavily on leverage provided by the UN Single Convention 
of 1961.  Much like the 1914 Harrison Act and the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act passed 
decades earlier,51 the new ratification slipped into law without any heightened awareness 
or expressed interest from the public.    
Following the hippies’ 1967 summer of love, President Johnson became more 
concerned about his administration’s lack of effectiveness in executing anti-drug law 
enforcement and made modest attempts to modify the federal government’s domestic 
strategy.  Johnson submitted a reorganization plan to Congress on February 7, 1968, that 
would abolish the Department of Treasury’s Bureau of Narcotics, including the office of 
Commissioner of Narcotics.  Since Harry Anslinger’s resignation, the FBN had fallen 
into disarray and succumbed to internal corruption and administrative backbiting.  Unless 
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Congress voted against the president’s proposal within sixty days, the bureau’s activities 
would be reassigned.  On April 8, that is exactly what happened.  Both the floundering 
Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) and the fledging Bureau of Narcotics were 
combined to create a new federal agency within the U.S. Department of Justice.  It would 
be officially known as the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), and 
agents would be directly responsible to Attorney General Ramsey Clark.52 
 Johnson’s administration may have been concerned about the nation’s growing 
drug problem, but domestic challenges to law and order seemed to steer it away from 
international narcotics control.  By the summer of 1968 a string of riots were ravaging 
across the country, and no end was in sight for the war in Vietnam.  The president called 
a cabinet meeting and demanded to know whether the Communists were behind the 
protests and violence.  Attorney General Ramsey Clark said there simply was not enough 
evidence to prove Communist instigators were to blame.53  However, others disagreed. 
 It was in this tumultuous climate that Richard Nixon emerged from the ashes of 
political defeat and positioned himself to regain the national spotlight and enter the race 
for The White House.  Whatever the causes, whatever the complexities, politicians and 
pundits viewed children fleeing traditional middle-class homes to find their way to San 
Francisco’s drug-infested Haight-Ashbury District, the riots and street crime, flag burning 
and antiwar marches, by a disambiguating name: the law-and-order issue.54   Like any 
other nation, the insurgent youth nation had its spectrum of diverse views.  With an 
increasing number of militant activists subscribing to Marxist dogmatisms, clashes 
between New Left factions took on the characteristics of revolutionary cultists.  
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“Participatory democracy” became the nametag for the New Left ideology.  Timothy 
Leary served as its voice when he coined the phrase, “Turn on, tune in, drop out,” and 
recommended running away from political participation in government.  As Nixonland 
author Rick Perlstein concludes, “The notion of the ‘Summer of Love’ as some kind of 
untroubled idyll became impossible for the media to sustain: too many desperate flower 
children were addicted to hard drugs, turning tricks to survive.”55 
 One of the themes that ran through Nixon’s relationship with hippies and 
protestors was that he believed they were naïve, spoiled young kids being manipulated by 
communist party instigators.  They were either willing participants or hapless pawns.  
Activists like “Hanoi Jane” Fonda would become prime examples.  Her foray overseas 
and interlude with Soviet leaders epitomized the exact kind of naiveté Nixon believed 
was fracturing the solidarity of his great nation.  In this sense Nixon’s attitude towards 
the counterculture was informed by his concerns about international relations. 
 In his run for the presidency in 1968, Richard Nixon labeled the law and order 
issue as a graver “national disorder.”  In an article published by Reader’s Digest, Nixon 
stated that, “The symptoms are everywhere manifest: in the public attitude toward police, 
in the mounting traffic in illicit drugs, in the volume of teenage-arrests, in campus 
disorders and the growth of white collar crime.”  “Far from becoming a great society,” he 
said, “Ours is becoming a lawless society.”  The future president was quick to connect 
this disorder to the nation’s foreign issues, by concluding, “Thus we find that many who 
oppose the war in Vietnam excuse or ignore or even applaud those who protest that war 
by disrupting parades, invading government offices, burning draft cards, blocking troop 
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trains, or desecrating the American flag.”56  For Nixon, crime, disregard for federal laws, 
and drugs all circumscribed the 1960s counterculture movement.    
 Richard Nixon continued to identify a connection between drug-abusing hippies 
and Communist foreign influences even a quarter of a century after his first successful 
presidential campaign.  In his final memoir published in 1994, Nixon offers a visit to the 
past in his comments about the future by stating, “The 1960s counterculture created a 
moral and spiritual vacuum that weakens the foundations of American society.”  He goes 
on to say, “The glorification of recreational drug use, from which the wealthy and middle 
class have only recently begun to recoil, has contributed to the emergence of a permanent 
urban underclass.  The self-indulgent notions of no-fault living, the cult of victimization, 
the futility of work, and the inherent injustice of American society, which the 
counterculture promoted, have corroded the respect for merit and personal striving, which 
are the human virtues surest to help individuals grow, develop moral codes, and achieve 
success.”57  One could easily mistake this rhetoric for stump speeches that were 
commonplace during the summer of 1968.   
 Nixon pledged during his 1968 campaign for president “the real voice of 
America” would be heard.  In his acceptance speech at the Republican National 
Convention, Tricky Dick personified the problem of crime and violence in America by 
declaring his administration would have a new cabinet and a new Attorney General to 
reestablish law and order for the country.58  The Republican Party’s nominee backed this 
pledge up by criticizing the languid domestic focus of President Johnson’s Justice 
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Department.  During a campaign visit to his boyhood home in California, Nixon blamed 
the Democrats for their laxity on narcotics control.  By way of contrast he pledged to 
arrest traffic in narcotics by: first seeking out the day after he takes office in January the 
cooperation and assistance of friendly nations, “which have been made conduits for 
drugs.”  Second, he would establish “multinational commissions with neighboring and 
other countries to stem the flow of drugs along our common borders and at other points 
of entry into the United States.”  Third, he pledged to triple the number of customs agents 
from 331 to 1,000, as suggested by Lyndon Johnson’s Presidential Crime Commission.  
Fourth, Nixon proposed accelerating the “development of tools and weapons to detect 
narcotics in transit,” to include what he described as a “long-overdue review of the 
smuggling laws of the United States.”  Finally the candidate stated that he favored a more 
forceful implementation of the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966.  Nixon 
topped off a description of his narcotics control initiatives by claiming only 305 addicts 
had been treated out of a national total of 60,000 since the legislation was passed by 
Congress and signed into law.59  
   Richard Nixon’s deep seeded disdain for the 1960s counterculture movement 
was influenced by his keen interest in international relations.  For the purposes of 
achieving victory in the 1968 presidential election, Nixon exploited public anxieties 
expressed by the so-called “silent majority” and offered initiatives that promised to return 
America to its preeminence.  Nixon’s past record of being hard on Communist influences 
and supporting traditional values reassured the nameless dread that would come to be 
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analyzed as government’s legitimation crisis.60  Yet Tricky Dick also used his political 
acumen and pejorative paranoia to look below social surfaces and find opportunities that 
would allow the United States to dominate a global balance of power and establish the 
foundations for a generation of peace.  The foreign influences associated with 
Communism, drug-using hippies, and antiwar protestors mark the American history 
phase of public hysteria that directly led to Nixon’s drug war.  Narcotics abuse and the 
counterculture movement posed frustrating obstacles to his foreign policy strategy, thus 
requiring immediate action upon his arrival to the Presidency of the United States. 
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Chapter 3:  Nixon’s Limited Drug War, 1969-1971 
Nixon’s Priorities  
 
Richard Nixon quickly asserted executive powers upon taking office of the 
President by issuing orders that significantly impacted U.S. foreign relations and 
international narcotics control.  The candidate had promised to listen to nation’s “silent 
majority” and committed to solve big government’s legitimacy crisis; now the newly 
elected president Nixon felt compelled to deliver with his persona as the political leader 
dedicated to re-establishing law and order in America.  Confronting drug abuse became a 
significant part of this initiative.  One can see from the President’s Public Papers that, “In 
enunciating the ‘Nixon Doctrine,’ in opening serious talks with the Soviet Union, in 
revitalizing America’s alliances, in reviewing our defense posture, and in many other 
initiatives that are discussed,” the Nixon Administration sought systematically and 
comprehensively to lay the groundwork for “a full generation of peace.”61  Although the 
electorate had been concerned about domestic issues, Nixon calculated political moves in 
the international arena would become instrumental in providing a path to world peace and 
domestic tranquility.   
From the first week of his presidency, foreign policy concerned Richard Nixon 
the most.  He devoted the majority of his time to the issue, because Nixon said, “there 
only the President can make some of the decisions.”  Beyond foreign policy, however, 
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the president told reporters he viewed the problems of America’s cities and economic 
problems as the next most demanding issues of the day.62   
Upon arrival to Washington, Richard Nixon was immediately hit with the realities 
of DC’s bitter crime wave.  A stark wakeup call about the ringing problem hit close to 
home after one of the employees at the White House fell victim to a purse snatching 
during the weekend before President Nixon’s first press conference.63  District of 
Columbia’s situation was not an exception to the rule of law throughout the land.  Serious 
problems of crime, disorder, social progress, and inflation all stood high on the nation’s 
list of concerns as the arriving administration took office.  These and many other pressing 
issues the new president faced were underlined by a more fundamental question: whether 
the U.S. Government itself was still sufficiently responsive and sufficiently effective to 
cope with the emerging needs of the 1970’s and beyond.64 
Nixon took emergency measures to deal with domestic problems and then used a 
similar approach to spark a national campaign against the flow of illegal drugs coming 
across America’s borders.  On January 31, 1969, the president announced a list of 
measures to push back against DC’s crime wave.  Since addiction to narcotic drugs was 
linked directly to the commission of criminal activities, one of Nixon’s instructions 
included increasing the role of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to 
increase its role in federal laws.65  Less than a month later The White House followed up 
with a memorandum for U.S. Attorney General Mitchell requesting the Department of 
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Justice to do even more to study the problem and employ additional personnel in a 
concentrated effort to look beyond the District of Columbia and find those cities which 
represent the major sources of supply.66 
Nixon Tasked his National Security Council 
 
 Despite Nixon’s passion for providing law and order at home, Vietnam remained 
a taxing burden during the president’s first years in office.  The conflict in Southeast Asia 
forced him to focus the majority of his time on crafting a tactical escalation of the war in 
order to provide a strategic withdrawal of U.S. forces.  Unlike his predecessors, Nixon 
relied heavily on his National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and the National 
Security Council (NSC) for guidance on foreign policy decisions.  Under Kissinger, the 
NSC greatly increased in size and importance, as the White House became the foreign 
policy maker.67 
 In his memoirs, Richard Nixon expressed a clear and candid understanding of the 
dynamics of foreign policy.  “It is true that the State Department should execute the game 
plan,” he said, “But the President must reserve the right to call the plays.”  The former 
president acknowledged that, “While the White House staff is usually well-advised to 
stay out of foreign policy operations, a strong National Security Council is indispensible, 
both to ensure that the President’s policy is followed and to coordinate it.”  Nixon 
believed foreign affairs were much more than diplomacy ushered by the State 
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Department.  According to him, “It also involves the activities of the Departments of 
Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and Justice, and the CIA.”68 
 In addition to emergency measures, executive memorandums, and relying on the 
National Security Council, President Nixon also empowered even the youngest members 
of his White House staff to deal with the crime and drugs issue.  Egil “Bud” Krogh 
entered the Nixon camp as Deputy counsel to Richard Nixon during the 1968 transition 
period and received an assignment in February of 1969 to take the lead on President 
Nixon’s first drug war initiative.  At twenty-nine years of age, Bud had recently 
completed law school at the University of Washington after completing four years of 
voluntary service in the U.S. Navy as a communications watch officer aboard USS 
Yorktown (CVS 10).69  Now he had just been given general responsibility to be “the 
President’s policy man on law enforcement and narcotics control,”70 which included 
working in places across the country and throughout the world along with representatives 
from the Departments of Justice, Treasury, State, and the intelligence agencies that 
worked in these areas.  1969 would be a year of learning through trial and error for Bud 
Krogh and the White House staff concerned with crime and drugs.  They discovered early 
that all heroin consumed in the United States was being manufactured abroad but were 
not quite sure how to approach the issue internationally.  As best they could, Bud and his 
colleagues spent time becoming aware of the scope of the problem nationally and in the 
District of Columbia before growing confident about their policy option suggestions to 
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the President.  The administration would begin with unilateral efforts with the 
governments of Mexico, France, and Turkey, which were believed to be the main source 
areas.71 
 While Krogh’s team dedicated themselves to identifying effective policies that 
could sustain national and international programs against drug abuse, Nixon accepted 
more evidence to justify immediate action.  On June 6, 1969, the Special Presidential 
Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs issued its findings and 
recommendations.  The report was a direct result of Richard Nixon’s campaign pledge to 
the American people made on September 16, 1968, at Anaheim, California when he 
promised to “move against the source of drugs” and to “accelerate the development of 
tools and weapons to detect narcotics in transit.”72  Members from several different 
government agencies convened in March and spent months focusing almost entirely on 
marijuana and giving special attention to drug smuggling operations from Mexico into 
the United States.  Their conclusions included recommendations to enhance border-
crossing restrictions, develop better drug detection methods and devices, and improve 
border surveillance of aircraft and vessels near American borders.  Most of the document 
remains withheld by the Nixon Library for national security reasons, but the final page of 
what has been made open to the public reemphasizes the President’s belief that, “The 
consumption in the United States of drugs and narcotics produced abroad has reached 
such proportion as to be in the highest rank of those matters affecting the vital interests of 
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the nation.”73  White House senior advisor John Ehrlichman summarized the entire thirty-
five page report into one sentence for his boss by saying, “The task force recommends 
that the Mexican government be forced into a program of defoliation of the marijuana 
plants (using borrowed or leased equipment from the United States) by commencing a 
campaign of strict enforcement and customs inspection at the border.”74 
 Thus, the first salvo in Nixon’s drug war aimed at Mexico and was justified by the 
findings of his presidential task force.  Three days after the findings and 
recommendations report was issued, high-level U.S. Government representatives met 
with their counterparts in Mexico City to consider all aspects of the illegal traffic in 
narcotics, marijuana, stimulants, and hallucinogenic drugs between the two neighboring 
countries.  Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst attempted to convince the Diaz 
Ordaz government of the urgent need to crack down on drugs but observed little 
commitment towards initiating any major programs.  As Newsweek reporter Elaine 
Shannon describes in her 1988 book on the drug war, Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, 
U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can’t Win, “The Mexican officials were cordial but 
noncommittal.  Kleindienst grew visibly annoyed as he realized that the sessions were, in 
the words of an aide, ‘just an exercise in hospitality.’”75  G. Gordon Liddy, one of the 
infamous convicts from the Watergate break-in, was involved with combating narcotics 
prior to joining the White House “plumbers unit.”  He served as a senior advisor in the 
Department of Treasury at the time of the American delegation’s visit to Mexico and 
recalled that, “The Mexicans, using diplomatic language of course, told us to go piss up a 
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rope.  The Nixon administration didn’t believe in the United States taking crap from any 
foreign government.  Its reply was Operation Intercept.”76  
Operation Intercept 
 
 Operation Intercept was a deliberate action authorized by President Nixon to 
effectively persuade the Mexican government to act more aggressively against marijuana 
and heroin production.  After the passive response to Washington from Mexican leaders, 
Richard Nixon authorized an action task force to perform confidential work whose 
accomplishments shall only be released by the White House.  He ordered government-
wide support for the task force and said its work must be given high priority, “because of 
the alarming increase during the past three yeas in the consumption of marihuana in 
particular by our Nation’s youth.”  Nixon’s memorandum designated John Ehrlichman, 
Counsel to the President, with the authority and responsibility to consider and resolve any 
problems which might arise and requested each Cabinet Officer and Agency head give 
his Department’s unqualified support to the task force in terms of cooperation, facilities, 
resources and personnel wherever and however possible.77  On July 14, 1969, President 
Nixon sent a special message to Congress, in which he identified drug abuse as “a serious 
national threat.”  The President called for a comprehensive anti-drug policy to be placed 
at both state and federal levels, citing a dramatic jump in drug-related juvenile arrests and 
street crime between 1960 and 1967 as his justification (juvenile arrests involving the use 
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of drugs had risen by almost 800 percent78).  He made it clear in this message America 
was going to work hard to deliver on the promises made to citizens of the United States.   
 At 2:30PM on Sunday, September 21, 1969, President Nixon announced the 
commencement of an anti-drug measure called Operation Intercept79.  Under the direction 
of U.S. Customs Department Commissioner Myles Ambrose, every vehicle crossing the 
Mexican border would be subject to a three-minute inspection.  He commanded his 
Customs agents by flying down to the border from Los Angeles and commented that, 
“The first day it was just incredible.  The backup was as far as you could see—it was 
miles and miles.“  “After that,” he said, “people realized they couldn’t get across, so they 
turned around and didn’t bother trying.  And there were all kinds of screams.  I mean we 
had screams from congressmen.”80  The operation lasted two weeks and had tremendous 
economic repercussions on both sides of the border. 
   Despite loud objections from shocked Mexican leaders and Americans living near 
the border, the Nixon Administration declared Operation Intercept a success and proved 
to the world the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government was serious about narcotics 
control and its desire to confront drug abuse.  When the border crossings backed up and 
traffic flow came to a screeching halt, those personally affected reacted in shock and 
horror.  Phone calls went out from angry individuals who demanded a remedy to the 
situation.  Mexicans expressed increasing agitation over what they felt was a blatant 
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disregard for mutual agreements between the two nations to consult and cooperate with 
one another on matters of mutual interest.  Mexico’s foreign minister Carillo Flores 
resulted to taking an unusual step in diplomatic relations by forwarding a hand written 
note to the President of the United States requesting his government to correct the 
“excess” of an action that was proving “negligible in stopping the traffic of marihuana 
and drugs, but great in harming the economy of both side.”  In response to the personal 
note, Henry Kissinger advised Nixon to end the operation and sign a letter expressing 
warm regards and willingness to meet with the Mexicans on the issue, saying, “I am sure 
that the bilateral talks which will be held will be able to find ways to achieve the 
objectives of Operation Intercept with minimum disruption of this kind.”81   
 The U.S. President followed diplomatic formalities by shooting off a more candid 
opinion to John Ehrlichman, in which he stated that the objectives of the operation have 
been accomplished.  Nixon’s reputation for consistently thinking strategically is further 
supported by the way he comments that, “It would appear that this is the time to negotiate 
since we have proved our point pretty effectively.”82  Without objections from Mexican 
leaders and Kissinger’s recommendation, who knows how long Operation Intercept may 
have gone on?  The measure was terminated by mid-October and replaced by a new anti-
drug agreement between the United States and its southern neighbor.  “Operation 
Cooperation” was the new solution in which both countries collaborated and committed 
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to regularly scheduled meetings that would produce a shared strategy to fight drug abuse 
and reduce the movement of illegal contraband moving across the border.   
 Kate Doyle, Senior Analyst of U.S. policy in Latin America assesses Operation 
Intercept served United States interests in several ways.  According to her article 
“Operation Intercept: The Perils of Unilateralism,” the radical measure was first the 
fulfillment of a campaign promise by a new Republican president to show that he could 
be tough on lawlessness, and thus earned Nixon domestic political points in his first year 
of office.  Second, it served as the opening shot in what would rapidly become a global 
war on drugs-a war that would far outlast the Nixon White House and would occupy 
successive administrations for decades to come.  Finally, it was an exercise in the politics 
of coercion, whereby Washington used economic and political blackmail to pressure 
Mexico into moving on an issue that mattered to the United States83.   
 Despite a public relations campaign designed by Nixon aides to promote the 
operation, press coverage on both sides of the border was derisively critical of the U.S. 
Government’s unilateral attempt to halt the flow of narcotics into its country.  Statistics 
on the amount of drugs seized and smugglers captured were far lower than expected.  G. 
Gordon Liddy points out in his autobiography, that the goal of Operation Intercept was 
not, in fact, to freeze the flow of drugs. "For diplomatic reasons the true purpose of the 
exercise was never revealed. Operation Intercept, with its massive economic and social 
disruption, could be sustained far longer by the United States than by Mexico.  It was an 
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exercise in international extortion, pure, simple, and effective, designed to bend Mexico 
to our will."84 
 The outcome of Operation Intercept also demonstrates how Henry Kissinger and 
the National Security Council served as strategic players in the Nixon administration.  
The White House required Justice and State Department officials to forward major 
national security and foreign policy memorandums to Mr. Kissinger for him to review 
prior to landing on the President’s desk.  On September 22, 1969, a day after announcing 
the commencement of Operation Intercept, President Nixon requested a recommendation 
on the heroin problem.  A week later, Dr. Kissinger issued a subsequent memorandum to 
follow up with the appropriate department staffs, and in response the Secretary of State 
and the Attorney General submitted a joint preliminary analysis of the situation.  
Substantial progress in reaching a permanent solution of this highly complex problem 
would require according to them, “…not only coordinated efforts with a number of other 
countries but also parallel efforts with the United States.”85 
Foreign Cooperation Alternatives   
 
 The analysis for the President presented a three-phase program to ensure effective 
foreign cooperation with the United States Government.  Phase one would be a 
diplomatic notification period.  The principal target nations, France, Turkey, and Mexico 
were already aware of American concerns with the drug problem, and knew about several 
measures, which the U.S. had previously proposed to control the traffic in heroin.  Phase 
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two consisted of technical and financial assistance for principle target nations to help 
facilitate their government’s actions against illegal substances.  If they did not comply, 
sanctions would be put in place as part of phase three.  The analysis concluded by 
offering predictions made by the BNDD about global reductions of illegal substances 
following anticipated implantation of the paper’s recommendations.  The first year would 
see 10-20% reductions, the second 20-40%, and the fifth year at 40-60%.  The memo was 
an optimistic plan of attack the President would adopt in the ensuing months as the drug 
war raged on. 
 The White House entertained a variety of options in dealing with international 
narcotics control.  Harry H. Schwartz, Chairman of the President’s Heroin Task Force, 
sent another follow-up report to the Executive Office of the President just eleven days 
after the first for the National Security Advisor’s review on October 31, 1969.  The 
confidential report again identified Turkey, Mexico, and Southeast Asia as the global 
suppliers of the illicit opium market.  Turkey and Mexico were highlighted as the sources 
of about 80% and 15% respectively for the heroin smuggled into the United States each 
year.86 
 The reports funneled through the National Security Council offered several 
alternative means of controlling narcotics produced in the interim period before state 
authorities would prohibit the drug’s production.  Pre-emptive buying of crude opium 
was the first suggestion presented, but Nixon’s Commissioner of Customs, Myles 
Ambrose, would eventually debunk this idea.  When asked about this recommendation, 
Ambrose prudently said, “You can grow opium on probably 70% of the earth’s surface.  
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And a mile or two square area would supply every heroin addict in the world.  I’m in the 
wrong business if you’re going to do this kind of thing.”87  He curtly followed up with a 
plausible outcome of having to buy out more and more growers each year. 
 The Nixon administration considered the United Nations as a possible avenue to 
further support for a global framework of controlling an international monopoly on illegal 
drugs.  This idea relied extensively on cooperation with foreign partners and presupposed 
effective enforcement of controls, a feat proven less than attainable at the time.  Other 
alternatives presented consisted of a world abolition of opium altogether.  This measure 
proposed relying on synthetic replacements to meet the needs of legitimate medical 
requirements.  The final recommendation was to rely exclusively on domestic production 
of gum opium.  However, the report disclosed there is little reason to believe that this 
would diminish the illicit supply.    
President Nixon’s Drug War Legislation had International Ramifications  
 
President Nixon placed high priority on legislation during 1970 that would 
contribute to international narcotics control and American drug abuse treatment 
programs.  He was determined to balance the federal budget in 1969 but protected 
funding for the war on drugs.  His administration cut more than $7 billion out of spending 
plans in order to produce a surplus in 1970, and in spite of the fact that Congress reduced 
revenues by $3 billion, Nixon pledged to recommend a balanced budget for 1971.  While 
determining any budget requires hard decisions, President Nixon told the Congress in his 
State of the Union address on January 22, 1970 that some spending programs “which 
would benefit some of the people” would have to be cut “when their net effect would 
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result in price increases for all people.”  “It is time to quit putting good money into bad 
programs,” he said.  “Otherwise, we will end up with bad money and bad programs.”88 
In reference to budget cuts, law enforcement programs were exempt.  In fact, 
President Nixon ordered an increase, rather than a cut, for federal agencies responsible 
for enforcing the nation’s laws.  This fiscal priority reflects Nixon’s desire to place 
fighting social evils at the top of his priorities.  It was an adamant stance against crime 
that laid the foundations for his war on drugs.  Nixon spoke out about crime by saying,  
We have heard a great deal of overblown rhetoric during the sixties in 
which the word “war” has perhaps too often been used—the war on poverty, the 
war on misery, the war on disease, the war on hunger.  But if there is one area 
where the word “war” is appropriate it is in the fight against crime.  We must 
declare and win the war against the criminal elements, which increasingly 
threaten our cities, our homes, and our lives. 
 
The president reminded lawmakers that, “Last year this administration sent to the 
Congress 13 separate pieces of legislation dealing with organized crime, narcotics, crime 
in the District of Columbia.  None of these bills have reached my desk for signature.”89  
Nixon’s address expressed his frustration with a session of Congress that seemed 
unmoved by his agenda. 
In addition to an intransigent Legislative Branch, the president faced additional 
challenges in executing his fight against international narcotics trafficking and drug 
abuse.  Nixon was challenged in preventing his cabinet secretaries from becoming so 
protective of their respective bureaucracies, that conflicts of opinion prevented 
substantial progress from being achieved.  The former chief executive surmises in his 
memoirs, “The one function that a President cannot delegate to anyone else is knocking 
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heads together when Cabinet and department heads engage in Washington’s favorite 
game of battling for turf.”  He spoke from experience, saying, “Waging war in Vietnam 
abroad was not easy, but waging war at home against drugs… …was even more 
difficult.”90  Within the Nixon administration, department heads pledged cooperation, but 
then challenged fellow secretaries to protect their respective institution.   
For instance, President Nixon had to sign a White House memorandum to his 
cabinet resolving differences of opinion in dealing with the responsibility of international 
narcotics control.  After referring the matter to the Advisory Council on Executive 
organization, President Nixon reviewed their report on February 5, 1970 and approved a 
few recommendations.  The first was that the BNDD should continue to represent the 
U.S. government in dealing with foreign law enforcement officials on narcotics 
questions.  This excluded the Treasury Department’s Customs Bureau from doing so, 
unless authorized by BNDD.  The second was that BNDD should be the sole federal 
agency to control the narcotics area.  Customs should support BNDD’s efforts to reduce 
and eliminate the flow of narcotics into the United States and its intelligence network 
should be used to assist in overall the overall effort.  The third recommendation 
designated the Attorney General as an authority who would resolve future disagreements 
on the matter.91 
This document proves President Nixon relished the role of “knocking heads 
together,” and that he exercised executive leadership to organize his global war on drugs.  
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From the early days of his presidency, relatively new institutions like the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs were given more jurisdiction and authority, and key 
individuals were appointed to become the generals of Nixon’s campaign against narcotics 
abuse and the international illicit drug trade.  
The rest of the year proved to be a productive one for the federal government in 
regards to approving new measures that supported Nixon’s agenda.  As a follow up to his 
winter address to Congress and the American people, President Nixon issued a 
proclamation designating the week beginning May 24, 1970 as Drug Abuse Prevention 
Week.92  The Federal Government planned seven days full of activities to stress the 
importance of educating the American public about the nature and the dangers of drug 
abuse.  The State Department was urged by the White House to take this opportunity to 
help its employees to become better informed about a subject that the President 
considered to be a pressing national problem.  The hope of the administration was that 
Drug Abuse Prevention Week would call attention to the extent of the problem and would 
also encourage Americans throughout the country to support long-term programs to solve 
it. 
For Nixon, cooperation with Congress and international partners was key to 
building a successful strategy to combat the drug problem and reduce crime.  The spring 
drive to draw attention to America’s drug problem led to legislative success that greatly 
influenced U.S. foreign and domestic policies.  On August 12, 1970, Senator Murphy 
introduced a bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  This legislation would 
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provide funding for a program to control illegal international traffic in narcotics and 
withhold United States assistance to nations refusing to cooperate with international 
organizations like the United Nations in taking appropriate steps to restrict the flow of 
illicit international drugs.93 
A stack of three bills made their way to the President’s desk two months later that 
would have global ramifications and provide a solid foundation for Nixon’s drug war.  
The Organized Crime Control Act materialized on October 15, 1970 with two sets of 
Senate hearings that concluded after twenty years of ongoing testimony and deliberation.  
Senator John L. McClellan, a Democrat from Arkansas, sponsored the bill, designed to 
constrain dubious gambling operations and provide federal grand juries with more potent 
powers to detain unmanageable witnesses.  The law also authorized the U.S. Attorney 
General to protect state and federal witnesses, along with their families.  The Witness 
Security measure, also referred to as the “Witness Protection Program,” was a bi-product 
of this bill and has played a significant role in the successful prosecution of many high 
profile U.S. and foreign national drug traffickers. 
The next significant bill passed by Congress in response to the President’s anti 
crime, anti-drug initiative would have even more of a global reach.  The 1970 Bank 
Secrecy Act was passed on October 26.  In response to numerous reports of people 
bringing bags full of money into the United States from questionable origin and 
depositing large volumes of currency into American banks, Congress passed Public Law 
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91-508, often referred to as the BSA.94  This bill aimed at stopping foreign bank secrecy 
laws used to conceal illegal activities such as organized crime and drug trafficking.  It 
also gave the Secretary of Treasury broad discretion about defining who was subject to 
the law and which financial records could be retained, in addition to requiring extensive 
paper trail records to be filled for currency transactions.  Although not passed with much 
fan fare, this law and its subsequent alterations, has become a useful weapon in the global 
war on drugs.  
The most publicly acclaimed act of 1970 in regards to Nixon’s anti-crime 
initiative was the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.  Under this 
law passed the day after the Bank Secrecy Act, controlled substances were divided into 
five schedules (or classes) based upon their potential for abuse, accepted medical use, and 
accepted safety under medical supervision.  This bill would become the legal foundation 
for Nixon’s drug war and the government’s fight against the abuse of banned substances.  
On the day President Nixon signed the act into law he remarked,  
Fifteen months ago I sent an urgent request to the Congress for legislation 
in this field. I requested it because our survey of the problem of drugs indicated 
that it was a major cause of street crime in the United States.  Those who have a 
drug habit find it necessary to steal, to commit crimes, in order to feed their habit. 
We found also, and all Americans are aware of this, that drugs are alarmingly on 
the increase in use among our young people. They are destroying the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of young people all over America, not just of college age 
or young people in their twenties, but the great tragedy: The uses start even in 
junior high school, or even in the late grades.  Under these circumstances, this is a 
national problem. It requires an urgent action on the part of the Federal 
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Government, and the Congress now has taken that action and, after 15 months, 
finally the bill will be signed.95 
  
For all the praises, Nixon was astutely aware of the bill’s limitations.  While it 
called for 300 new federal drug law enforcement officers and extended the jurisdiction of 
the justice department, Nixon called upon the nation to do more.  In particular, the 
president encouraged fellow Americans to look forward in the field of drug addiction.  
“This is enormously important,” he said.  Investigating the treatment of drug addicts was 
one of the reasons why the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare was represented at the bill’s signing.  “Because,” said Nixon, “…once the 
individual who gets hooked on drugs is in that condition, he is one that we must have 
sympathy for.”96  From the beginning of Nixon’s Administration, a clear distinction 
between drug addicts, and drug traffickers was made and reflected in the reactions to the 
1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.   
President Nixon considered the problem with narcotics and dangerous drugs to be 
more than a domestic issues requiring just within the United States.  He sought to 
influence world leaders who could help him control what he perceived as harmful foreign 
influences upon society.  When Congress was debating whether or not to approve 
Nixon’s anti-drug legislation, the President continued to seek support from his national 
security advisor.  After an afternoon conversation with Kissinger, Richard Nixon 
scribbled down notes of “ACTION for HAK,” requesting the due date for his draft 
version of the President’s Annual Review of American Foreign Policy be moved to 
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November 15, along with an additional section entitled “New Tasks for Diplomacy: e.g. 
hijacking, narcotics, pollution, and space.”97  This personal note signed “RN” further 
proves the president was interested in utilizing his drug war as a tool in foreign relations.   
President Nixon used the UN as a forum to advocate against harmful foreign 
influences like illegal drugs.  In his Address to the 25th Anniversary Session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on October 23, 1970, Nixon included a concise 
but significant portion about curbing narcotics traffic: 
 Drugs pollute the minds and bodies of our young people, bringing misery, 
violence, and human and economic waste. This scourge of drugs can be 
eliminated through international cooperation. I urge all governments to support 
the recent recommendations of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, to take 
the first step toward giving them substance by establishing a United Nations Fund 
for Drug Control. And I urge all governments to support a strengthened narcotics 
treaty that would govern all production by restricting it solely to medical and 
scientific purposes. The United States has already circulated such a proposal for 
consideration at the next session of the U.N. Narcotics Commission.98 
 
The president’s administration went to great lengths to ensure Nixon’s drug war 
would be included in official U.S. foreign policy.  The National Security Study 
Memorandum (NSSM No. 102) contained President Nixon’s anticipated annual review of 
American foreign policy, and portions about narcotics were included.  As a result, 
government departments and agencies included reactionary comments in secret 
documents that have since been declassified.  In Response to NSSM No. 102, the Central 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) produced A Review of Major International Developments 
During 197099.  The document states: 
Nineteen-seventy saw the launching of a major innovation in US foreign 
policy, reflecting the Administration’s great concern over the serious impact on 
American society of rapidly increasing drug abuse and related crime.  Convinced 
that controlling illegal importation and distribution of narcotic drugs was vastly 
more than a domestic problem, the US initiated a series of moves designed to 
secure the cooperation of a number of countries involved in or concerned with the 
production and distribution of opium and its derivative heroin.  
 
The report then outlined specific goals of the United States.  First it was to 
eliminate illegal opium production, second its conversion overseas into heroin, and third 
its illicit entry into the country.  CIA corroborated the State Department’s assessment that 
Turkey was estimated of producing 80 percent of the heroin entering the U.S., via France 
and Western Europe.  Collaboration with French authorities was mentioned as an 
instrumental breakthrough in tackling the difficult problem of rooting out the clandestine 
laboratories there that convert Turkish opium into heroin for the drug traffickers 
supplying the American market.  President Ordaz of Mexico was also included in the 
report.  His administration was said to be working closely with US agencies to control the 
flow of narcotics from Mexico, which was determined to supply some 15 percent of the 
U.S. market for opium derivatives. 
The Secretary of the Treasury was even more explicit in elevating Nixon’s drug 
war to a matter of international relations.  In response to NSSM 102, he said, “This 
Administration has made the drug problem a foreign policy issue and has taken initiatives 
in eliciting the cooperation of the Governments of Turkey, Mexico, and France.”  “In the 
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past,” he continued, “the primary contact with foreign governments in this area had been 
almost exclusively limited to the enforcement level.  Now, through the use of diplomacy, 
we have made a substantial advance toward our objectives.”  These were first to make 
“processing and producing nations aware of the terror drugs can bring to our societies,” 
and the second to make, “those nations aware of our sense of urgency so that, even 
though their own immediate interest in tighter measures of control is less acute than our 
own, they are moving ahead with measurable progress.“100  Secretary Kennedy’s remarks 
emphasized the way in which Nixon’s drug war would coerce other states to yield to 
America’s will.  However, a week later the National Security Council edited the 
Secretary’s mentioning of Mexico, since they believed it to be “tantamount to saying that 
we forced their cooperation,” which would therefore “be disastrous in light of our past 
problems resulting from Operation Intercept and the extreme sensitivity of the Mexicans 
on this subject.”101    
Nixon’s Limited Drug War Focused on Turkey, France, and Mexico 
 International origins of Nixon’s drug war were initially limited to a few foreign 
countries.  After addressing the United Nations and appealing to dignitaries from around 
the globe, Nixon supported direct and in-direct engagement with the governments of 
Turkey, France, and Mexico.  Nixon continued to concern himself with the primary 
objective of getting U.S. forces out of Vietnam and therefore delegated diplomatic 
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messaging about his anti-drug initiatives to key players within the Executive branch.  
These individuals worked with international partners throughout the world but achieved 
early successes in illegal narcotics supply reduction in three places: Turkey, France, and 
Mexico. 
TURKEY 
Nixon’s drug war amplified modest efforts made by President Lyndon Johnson to 
get involved with Turkey’s opium exports and magnified U.S. diplomatic relations with 
its NATO ally in order to restrict the flow of illegal narcotics.  From 1965 onwards, the 
Johnson administration’s policy towards Turkey imposed a mix of foreign aid and 
diplomatic pressure.  For instance, the White House authorized a $3 million loan in 1968 
to help Turkey cultivate alternative crops and prevent the diversion of poppy into illicit 
channels.   To counter the incentive with diplomatic pressure, the United States 
government capped amounts of legal Turkish opiates that could be purchased for 
America’s pharmaceutical industry and committed to increased import quotas from India.  
As an additional measure, U.S. trade representatives persuaded other members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to do the same.102   
Harvard trained political scientist and investigative journalist Edward Jay Epstein 
elaborates on Turkey and the War of the Poppies in his book Agency of Fear: Opiates 
and Political Power in America.  First published in 1977 and then again in 1990, 
Epstein’s work includes a detailed account of U.S. diplomatic relations with Turkey 
during the Nixon years.  He argues Nixon and Kissinger’s national security strategy 
dominated by realpolitik led U.S. officials towards the Mediterranean in their prosecution 
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of the illicit drug trade.  Turkey was the one place where the White House could expect 
dramatic results, which is precisely what President Nixon desired most in regards to his 
anti-narcotics initiatives.  Other countries like Burma, Laos, and Afghanistan lacked a 
strong enough central government to effect cohesive control over indigenous tribes 
growing and smuggling opium poppies.  Iran was friendly towards U.S. interests at the 
time, but as Epstein points out, given the realities of oil politics, it was considered 
impolitic and futile to attempt to restrain the Shah from replanting poppy in his 
country.103  Thus Turkey became a high priority during the initial stages of Nixon’s war 
on drugs. 
 Declassified internal government documents substantiate Edward 
Epstein’s investigative scholarship about the Nixon administration’s keen interest in 
Turkey.  The Task Force on Heroin Suppression Memorandum for the President sent to 
the White House in the late fall of 1969 declared the most effective approach to narcotics 
control would require pre-emptive buying of the entire poppy crop before any opium 
crude is produced.  According to the memo, the opium poppy culture was already 
controlled in Turkey.  By the exercise of eminent domain, the Turkish Government could 
appraise each grower’s acreage and probable production, plow under, burn or chemically 
destroy the plants and pay the farmer for his crop.  At the same time, the grower could be 
induced to plant substitute crops or whatever is feasible in alternative land use.  In so 
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doing it was believed that the illicit market would be suddenly deprived of its major 
source of raw material and would be forced to drastic measures in adjustment.104  
President Nixon soon agreed with the State Department’s suggestion that U.S. 
Ambassador to Turkey William Handley should make a renewed effort to obtain the 
Turkish Prime Minister’s agreement to destroy his nation’s poppy crop.  To assist in the 
effort, Dr. Kissinger recommended offering a $5 million grant-financed commodity 
import program.  If the Turks would not bite on that lucrative offer, the White House was 
willing to increase legal purchase of the 1970 crop, coupled with an agreement by the 
foreign partner to stop poppy production the following year.  Since pre-emptive purchase 
activities of drugs would be an interagency effort Mr. Egil Krogh would be requested by 
the National Security Council to be freed from his Domestic Council assignments under 
senior advisor John Ehrlichman.  His new assignment required him to travel to Turkey 
and supervise efforts to eliminate Turkey as a source of illegal opium production.105 
Letters the White House had received from various individuals expressing interest 
in the matter may have influenced Dr. Kissinger’s recommendation.106  For instance, the 
president of U.S. Peoples Fund for the United Nations, a non-profit organization 
supporting the United Nations humanitarian projects, wrote the President on December 
23, 1969.107  He suggested the UN Division of Narcotic Drugs, headquartered in Geneva, 
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should expand worldwide efforts to eliminate cash crops from which narcotic drugs are 
produced at the source.  Realizing such an initiative is rather complicated; Mr. Evans 
beseeched President Nixon to do more to supplement the U.N. Division’s meager budget 
of $75,000 for its worldwide narcotic crop subsistence program.  The point of his letter 
was to notify the White House of his organization’s support and urge the President to 
enlist support through private donations to the U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs by 
issuing a statement to the mass media that would focus public attention to take at least 
this one logical step towards ending what he called an “international evil.”  The main 
justification for paying off poppy farmers was that it seems like the most logical means of 
getting to the root of the nation’s drug problem.  “We pay subsidies to gentlemen farmers 
for not growing certain crops,” he said.  “Why not a subsidy through the UN to farmers 
abroad to stop growing narcotic crops?”  To him and countless others the United Nations 
was the logical vehicle appropriate to drive to the success of such a program on a global 
scale.   
The White House eventually realized additional bilateral pressure on Turkey to 
eliminate all opium production could well be counterproductive.  Kissinger was urged by 
Elliot Richardson to pursue a complete cessation of all opium production anywhere in the 
world in order to maximize pressure on Turkey to set a good example on the international 
stage.108  The U.S. Treasury was prepared to delay or even disapprove Turkish requests 
for 850,000 tons of wheat, because Turkey had not been sufficiently forthcoming in 
restricting, or eliminating, opium production.  The withholdings idea was recommended 
by Customs Bureau chief Eugene Rossides, who was irate over the approval of a $40 
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million program loan for Turkey despite the country remaining insistent upon growing 
and exporting opium poppies.  However, the Secretary of State felt very strongly that any 
measures the U.S. took that would be considered by Turkey to be punitive in nature 
would not advance the American goal of stemming the illicit diversion of opium and 
would do extensive damage to other exceedingly important aspects of U.S. relations with 
its Turkish friends.109 
Turkish news reports provided additional proof American bilateralism was 
becoming counterproductive.  A series of articles entitled “Opium Report” were 
published during 1970 in Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet.  Written by native journalist 
Ozgen Acar, considerable research appears to have gone into the preparation of the 
articles that were circulated to over 100,000 readers from July 5 to July 20.  The stories 
are marked by xenophobic flourishes and vicious charges against the United States 
claiming the Americans’ opium war was resulting in the further impoverishment of the 
Turkish poppy farmer and a loss of foreign exchange earnings.  Acar asserted that 
Turkey’s loss is other countries’ gain since world need for opium is on the rise.  He also 
speculates that a major factor in U.S. interests in choking off Turkish opium production 
include the desire for American manufacturers to be able to expand the synthetic 
narcotics market by eliminating natural competition.110  
Turkish news reports about the American led initiative to control narcotic drugs 
preceded multilateral meetings about international narcotics control.  While admitting 
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some dereliction of its obligations under the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
Turkey remained unwilling by September of 1970 to meet the United States on key issues 
regarding the control of drugs.  Turkish representatives argued at the special session of 
the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) that total worldwide elimination of poppy 
growing is neither a practical nor an adequate solution to drug trafficking.111  This 
position presented a heightened hurdle for the U.S. track towards restricting the global 
exchange of dangerous substances. 
President Nixon became personally involved with diplomatic relations when 
faced with the likely outcome of losing a drug war battle in a place that was supposed to 
offer the greatest chances for dramatic results.  On October 2, 1970, BNDD Director John 
Ingersoll sent a SECRET telegram to U.S. Attorney General informing him that Turkish 
Ambassador Kirca, who was Turkey’s Permanent Representative in Geneva and chief 
delegate for the special session Commission Narcotic Drugs had just told him the 
previous night he considered it very important the BNDD Director carry with him a 
secret message on an upcoming visit to Turkey.  It was a secret letter from President 
Nixon to Prime Minister Demirel couched in warm personal terms requesting the 
assistance of Turkish government in strengthening controls over illicit drug production 
and traffic. 
Nixon intervened to personally ensure Turkey would not become a losing battle.  
Ambassador Kirca was exceedingly cooperative with the United States at the important 
meeting of commission on narcotic drugs in Geneva.  He was first to agree to co-sponsor 
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US resolution for integrated international action program and UN Fund for Drug Control.  
The Government of Turkey even commissioned him to shepherd through Turkish 
Parliament in November and December a bill for licensing and control systems in 
compliance with Turkish Treaty obligations.112 
The Nixon Administration’s focus on Turkey was magnified by increased 
Congressional inquiries about the narcotics problem.  In March 1971, Senator Frank 
Church alluded to the Turkish government when he said, “A halt in our economic 
assistance to some foreign governments can be an effective tool in halting the flow of 
illegal narcotics.  The very nations that have failed to stop the illegal traffic of narcotics 
across their boundaries into the United States are major recipients of our aid.”113  Senator 
Church found it difficult to understand why the Turkish Government failed to clamp 
down on illegal drug crop.  He believed the underlying reason for the failure was due to a 
lack of will.114  Church contrasted Turkish laxity toward drug smugglers with swift law 
enforcement imposed by neighboring Iran.115 
Chairman of United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed Senator 
Church’s diatribe a few days later with a request for coordinated Executive Branch 
comments on new legislation.  The bill was proposed to amend section 620 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit countries, which do not act to prevent narcotic drugs 
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from unlawfully entering the United States.116  In response, Senator Fulbright was 
reminded of a previous statement issued by the State Department: 
During the course of our efforts to find a solution to this problem and in 
our discussion with a number of governments on this subject, it has become quite 
clear this is an international problem, which will require international action to 
resolve.  Therefore, we intend to supplement our intensive bilateral negotiations 
with an even greater emphasis on improving international machinery aimed at 
better controls over the production of narcotics and the elimination of the illicit 
traffic in drugs.117 
 
Even the Senate Finance Committee got involved.  In response to Chairman 
Russell B. Long’s letter urging the President to take necessary measures to prevent heroin 
from being imported into the United States, the State Department took the opportunity to 
bring attention to the significance of the problem.  Senator Long was told that the 
elimination of the illegal international traffic in heroin, other narcotics and other 
dangerous drugs “is a high priority objective of our foreign policy, to be pursued 
vigorously through both multilateral and bilateral channels.”  The remainder of the 
correspondence favors urgent and expanded international action to meet the problem of 
drug abuse at the critical points of supply, demand and illicit traffic, in order to stem the 
spread of drug abuse not only in our own country but also throughout the world.118 
Despite Turkey’s domestic opposition, the Turkish government responded to U.S. 
pressure since the country depended on American economic support and strong military 
ties within NATO.  President Nixon insisted that Turkey either prevent the diversion of 
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opium into illicit channels or prohibit poppy cultivation entirely.  On March 12, 1971, 
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel bowed to the pressure of Turkish armed forces and 
stepped down from power.  Economic concerns coupled with a wave of terrorist attacks 
committed by radical groups brewed instability to a boiling point, and civil unrest ensued.  
Backed by the Turkish military, Nihat Erim replaced Demirel and immediately received 
pressure from President Nixon via the U.S. embassy in Ankara to make rapid and visible 
progress on the drug problem.  On June 29, 1971, the Erim administration announced that 
the 1971-1972 poppy harvest would be the nation’s last.119  Two days later Secretary of 
State William Rogers sent a TELEGRAM to the American Embassy in Ankara to say 
congratulations to all who facilitated the successful outcome of negotiations to bring an 
end to the illicit flow of open from Turkey.  “You and your staff have done a fine job in 
working with the Turkish Government to bring a satisfactory solution to this critical 
problem of suppressing illicit flow of drugs at the source.”120 
Although Turkey’s poppy ban was immediately controversial within in its own 
borders, the Nixon administration claimed its first victory in the global war on drugs.  
The decision incited angry reactions among the Turkish elite and public masses, which 
both accused the government of crumbling under pressure from Washington.  Despite 
opposition from public opinion and Turkish legislators, the government rigorously 
enforced the ban and tolerated the ensuing loss of livelihood for an estimated 600,000 
Turkish poppy farmers.121  Some American politicians questioned the effectiveness of the 
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ban.  Nihat Erim subsequently turned over to other leaders, and the government returned 
to democratic rule in 1973.  The ban would be reversed the following year.  
FRANCE 
 The French Government was much more accommodating to cooperation than 
Turkey in Nixon’s Drug War and proved to be an effective ally in the global fight against 
illegal narcotics trafficking.  However, officials in France initially required motivation 
from Washington.  In August 1969 Daniel Patrick Moynihan traveled to Paris where he 
met with the American minister and told him about Nixon’s decision to make the 
international drug traffic a matter of highest priority in foreign affairs.  This 
pronouncement, according to Moynihan, elicited genuine puzzlement.  The minister 
knew almost nothing of the subject and certainly had no inkling that his government back 
home was concerned about it.122 
 French authorities were surprised by American zeal towards combating the drug 
trade.  Much progress had been achieved in combating the French Connection during the 
early 1960s, and French police seemed satisfied with the current status quo.  By 1969 
U.S. Ambassador Shriver reported coordination between the U.S. and French on 
narcotics matters had reached “an all-time high.”123  In early October, however, Shriver 
called on French Minister of Interior Marcellin to convey to him U.S. concerns about the 
illegal production of heroin in France.  The French Minister appeared skeptical when told 
that 80% of all heroin reaching American shores comes from France, but then said that he 
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understood and wanted to be responsive to President Nixon’s concern over this problem.  
In fact, French President Pompidou was also concerned and encouraged his colleagues to 
cooperate fully and openly with U.S. authorities in this matter.124 
 The crass approach taken by the Nixon administration towards Mexico leading up 
to Operation Intercept was simultaneously used in France during 1969.  Just two weeks 
after the congenial Shriver-Marcellin talks, a story broke in France’s media circuit that 
was completely unexpected by French officials.  Widespread coverage was given to an 
Associated Press report that Nixon’s Assistant Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst 
had made off-the-record comments saying, “The Nixon Administration is widening the 
war on narcotics by putting pressure on France to clamp down on clandestine drug 
factories,” and that “diplomatic relations may be altered considerably if France does not 
respond.”125  French narcotics authorities said they were both “astounded” and 
“discouraged” that such a statement should be made at precisely a moment when 
cooperation was close between the U.S. and France.  After expressing their private 
concern, the French Central Narcotics Bureau conferred with the Minister of Interior, and 
then issued a public response which charged that the “idea that France remains the 
keystone for the shipment of heroin to the U.S. is out of date.”  The French Bureau went 
on to defend efforts made by its national police forces in dealing with the flow of drugs.  
U.S. narcotics officials within the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs noted that 
                                                
124 Ibid. 
125 Associated Press, “Nixon Seeks French Aid in War on Drugs,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), 
October 18, 1969, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Los Angeles Times (1881-1989), 11. 
 
 34  
after the statement, relations with the French service appeared to be returning to 
“normal,” i.e. poor.126 
TURKISH-FRENCH CONNECTION 
 Despite French claims that their nation had no drug problem, the United States 
pushed to dismantle the French-Turkish connection and completely restrict the movement 
of opium or morphine base from Turkey to France.  According to an official statement 
made by retired Marine Corps General Lewis W. Walt, Director of the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Internal Security Task Force Investigation on World Drug Situation, 
there were two major routes by which heroin entered the United States during the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  The first was the already mentioned “Turkish-French 
connection;” the second route was referred to as the “Far East Connection.”127   
 The “Turkish-French connection” involved opium grown in Turkey that was 
subsequently processed into morphine base and then moved to Marseilles, France.  Here 
it was converted into heroin and prepared for shipment to U.S. black markets.  From 
Marseilles, the heroin traveled to the United States via a number of routes, direct and 
indirect.  A good deal of it came directly to New York by individual smugglers who 
either carried the dope on their person or had it concealed in double bottomed trunks or 
tucked away in specially built compartments on vehicles.  These methods and the non-
fictional account of a thrilling international narcotics case that unfolded in New York 
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City were famously revealed in Robin Moore’s The French Connection.  Published in 
1969, the book was immediately adapted into a screenplay by Ernest Tidyman and went 
on to become a blockbuster hit in Hollywood.   
 Timing of the theatrical release of The French Connection was impeccable for 
Nixon’s drug war.  The book was first published just as the Nixon administration began 
its calls for attention to America’s crime and drug problem.  Motion picture director 
William Friedkin put so much energy and enthusiasm into making the film that it was a 
smashing success and received recognition for Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actor, 
Best Adapted Screenplay, and Best Film Editing during the 1972 Academy Awards.  
More relevant than dominating the Oscars, the movie brought desired attention to 
France’s role in the international illicit drug trade and served as a causal factor in 
convincing government authorities to do more to control the transnational flow of 
narcotics.   
 Nixon’s direct engagement with French President Pompidou was the main factor 
in fostering greater foreign cooperation.  The President attached the highest importance to 
the narcotics problem and continued to make special efforts with the Government of 
France, particularly to eliminate the manufacture of heroin in illicit laboratories.  Over 
the winter following the 1969 fall cooling of U.S.-French relations, the White House gave 
much greater emphasis to the undertaking of breaking the Turkish-French connection.  
Nixon replaced Shriver in 1970 with Arthur K. Watson, who resigned his positions as 
chairman of the board of IBM World Trade and vice chairman and director of IBM, to 
become U.S. Ambassador to France.  He moved to Paris and worked closely with Mr. 
Egil Krogh, Nixon’s deputy counsel on matters pertaining to international narcotics 
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control.  They had several meetings with senior French officials specifically on the 
narcotics issue.  A joint task force of the United States and French representatives began 
meeting every quarter to review their respective efforts and to decide what additional 
steps should be instituted.  These programs included the assignment of additional French 
police and narcotics agents to the campaign to eliminate all illicit laboratories.  The 
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs undertook a special training program for 
French foreign nationals and assisted in the procurement of special and general 
equipment for use in the fight against the heroin-producing labs.  In March President 
Nixon hosted French President Pompidou and a state delegation in Washington.  
Cooperative efforts between nations were discussed, and both governments reaffirmed 
their determination to deal successfully with the drug problem.128   
 Nixon and Pompidou’s mutual resolution intensified bilateral law enforcement 
cooperation.  Action taken after the French president’s visit to Washington resulted in 
increased numbers of officers assigned to narcotics enforcement and led to the signing of 
an agreement negotiated between Attorney General Mitchell and Interior Minister 
Marcellin to permit even more American law enforcement personnel to operate in France.  
In 1969, only eight officers had worked for Marseille’s anti-narcotics unit.  Within two 
years, their number increased to seventy-seven.129  At a public ceremony in Paris on July 
24, Bud Krogh joined BNDD Director Jack Ingersoll to extend President Nixon’s 
gratitude for France’s cooperation.  This collaboration, according to Ingersoll, had been 
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manifested in the successful conclusion of several joint investigations conducted by 
French police and BNDD agents. The latest, according to State Department records, had 
resulted in a seizure of 156 kilograms of morphine base in the Marseille area, and at 
Milan with the cooperation of Italian police.  Six international traffickers with Near 
Eastern backgrounds were also arrested as a part of the investigation.130  Without the 
initiative from Nixon’s Administration, the French connection may have continued for 
years.  Beginning in 1970 however, unprecedented international law enforcement 
pressure ended the impunity of nefarious European drug traffickers operating out of 
Marseilles.   
MEXICO 
President Nixon gave stopping the flow of hard drugs into the United States the 
highest priority as early as 1969.  In addition to Turkey and France, cooperation from 
Mexico was essential.  During a closed-door meeting that was called on October 18 to 
answer questions for congressmen concerned about repercussion from Operation 
Intercept, the Nixon Administration repeated its contention that much of the supply of 
hard drugs smuggled into the United States through Mexico comes from illicit drug 
processors in France.  Representative Richard White, a Texan Democrat, set up the 
meeting between members of Congress and supported continuous engagement with top-
level U.S. and Mexican officials in Mexico City.  He and many others received the 
impression that the attorney general’s office, and to some extent the Administration, got a 
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little bruised over the fallout from Operation Intercept.131  The border searches by U.S. 
officials brought out-cry from both sides of the border but especially in Mexico where 
tourist business was curtailed.   
Such strong reactions may be why Mexican officials were quick to respond to any 
hint the United States would resume the unilateral act.  On June 17, 1970, Nixon’s 
Treasury Secretary Kennedy told an audience of U.S. mayors that the Administration 
would renew war on narcotics smugglers, in spite of possible irritation to legitimate 
travelers.  Such action was prompted, because he said, “the drug problem has become a 
drug crisis.”  An English language news article in Mexico quoted the secretary and 
reported that, “There are indications that Washington may resume Operation Intercept,” 
which it reminded readers, “brought relations to their lowest point in decades.”132  The 
editorial concludes that Operation Cooperation should be continued. 
Operation Cooperation 
In response to American concerns about Mexico’s sincerity in support for Nixon’s 
drug war, Mexican officials publicized the results of Operation Cooperation.  The same 
day Secretary Kennedy was quoted by the media, Mexico’s semi-official Nacional 
carried a front-page article quoting their country’s attorney general.  Sanchez Vargas 
issued a statement saying that, “Since beginning of Operation Cooperation, Mexican 
authorities have seized 297 Kilos (173 tons) of marijuana, over 40 Kilos of marijuana 
seed, over 19 Kilos of opium, 11 Kilos of cocaine, 2 Kilos of morphine, and 11 Kilos of 
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heroin.”  “In addition,” he said, “authorities have made 1,294 arrests that included 187 
Americans, 2 Canadians, 1 German, 3 Colombians, and 1 Arab.”  The American 
Embassy in Mexico commented to Washington that it was not at all unlikely that Sanchez 
Vargas’ scorecard was given in direct response to Kennedy’s remarks.133  
Long after Operation Intercept had been replaced with Operation Cooperation, the 
Mexican Press continued to publish angry articles about U.S. counter narcotic activities.  
On June 19, 1971, El Heraldo deplored the serious impairment to tourism and commerce 
caused by Operation Intercept and urged the Mexican government to appeal to 
Washington.  Other Mexican news groups featured similar reports.  On June 22, El 
Mexicano headlined stories about a renewal of “Operacion Intercepcion.”  The news 
agency featured complaints from the president of Mexico’s National Chamber of 
Tourism in Tijuana about serious economic losses in revenue from 20 to 25 percent.  
Hector Lutteroth was quoted as saying, “In the last eleven years, only during Operation 
Intercept have we seen a situation similar to the one we are experiencing now.”  The 
Chambers of Tourism, Commerce and Industry and their sister chambers in San Diego 
reacted by petitioning the highest authorities of Mexico and the United States to find an 
immediate solution to the problem which was causing such ill-will between the two 
countries.   
Another Mexican newspaper, Noticias, also quoted Lutteroth and claimed that the 
San Diego Chamber of Commerce and the San Diego Tourist and Convention Bureau 
have asked U.S. Congressman Bob Wilson to investigate the matter in Washington in 
order to publicly criticize “…the procedures of the American Immigration authorities at 
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the international border.”134  Official documents from the U.S. Department of State 
indicate that it is was obvious Mexico’s local press did not give much credence to District 
Director of US Customs Vernon Hahn’s explanation that the delays at border crossings 
were temporary; that they were due to lack of funds for overtime pay; and that the 
situation would ease on July 1, 1971, when new funds would become available.135 
Despite the calamity that manifested itself during Operation Intercept, the 
Mexican government counted on United States’ support throughout the history of 
America’s Global War on Drugs.  Mexican Ambassador Oscar Rabasa was an active 
agent in anti-drug efforts and worked closely with famed drug warrior Harry Anslinger 
since 1949.  Rabasa is just one example of many Mexicans who spent decades laboring to 
cultivate the narcotics cooperation between both countries and the world well before the 
problem became a full-blown crisis in the 1970s.  Rabasa witnessed substantial progress 
over the years that led up to President Nixon’s well-publicized international campaign.  
Ambassador Oscar Rabasa was also one of the participants in several summit meetings 
between U.S. and Mexican government officials. 
By the insistence of the Nixon administration, cabinet level consultations resumed 
between officials of the United States and Mexico on the control of narcotics, marijuana, 
and other dangerous drugs.  Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst traveled to Mexico 
City in 1970 to lead a U.S. delegation in narcotics control meetings from September 21-
23.  During a plenary session he presented remarks that summarized U.S.-Mexican 
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relations since the Nixon administration took office of the Presidency.  He said that the 
Nixon administration was not faced simply with a serious problem but rather with a 
crisis.  He referred to Nixon’s pledge to the voters to do something about that crisis.  
There was in this recognition that it was not simply a problem in the United Stets but a 
more general problem throughout the world.   
Kleindeinst described what had been accomplished by Mexico and the U.S. in the 
past year and a half as unprecedented in relations between two countries.  He noted that 
an important part of this progress was the joint recognition of the problem and the need to 
do something about it.  He said that the two nations have demonstrated that we can work 
together without any implication that one country is trying to dictate to the other and that 
we have reached a point where each government feels free to call for joint consultations 
whenever the situation warrants.  He felt that some self-congratulation was in order but 
was sure that no one wanted to give the impression that the task was accomplished.    
Kleindeinst praised his Mexican counterpart Franco Rodrigues for his energetic 
role in the anti-drug campaign and then described a few things that the U.S. Government 
has been doing in this field.  He mentioned that the budget of the BNDD had been 
increased from 14million dollars to 35 million dollars since Nixon came into office.  He 
expressed the President’s hope that legislation would soon come out of Congress 
permitting the U.S. government to control more effectively dangerous substances, 
particularly the dangerous drugs, that are of concern to Mexico.  He said that 900 to 
1,000 additional customs agents are being added to the rolls and that they will permit 
more effective inspections with a minimum of frictions and interference.   
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He expressed the belief that as the result of a widespread public campaign the 
American people are now firmly behind the government in its anti-drug efforts.  He 
concluded his remarks by saying that the real problem facing the governments of Mexico 
and the U.S. is the preservation the two nations’ cultures.136 
In response to the Deputy Attorney General’s remarks, Franco Rodriguez 
delivered the principal statement for the Mexican delegation.  He began by expressing 
great joy and words of praise for the comments expressed by Kleindienst and reassured 
the audience that the Mexican government intends to strengthen and improve its efforts.  
Then he referenced the past by reminding everyone that the day he was speaking marked 
the anniversary of the start of Operation Intercept, which in the words of Diaz Ordaz, 
“…created a wall of suspicion between the two countries.”  However, as a result of 
Operation Cooperation and the great understanding on the part of top officials in the two 
governments this setback in the relations between the two governments had been 
overcome.  He emphasized that present endeavors are marked by enthusiasm, good faith 
and determination.  Here he threw in a special word of praise for the Mexican army and 
attributed a great part of the credit for Mexico’s increased activity to President Diaz 
Ordaz who he described as dedicated to the task.  Since January 1, 1970, he said, 94.3 
tons of marijuana has been burned.  In July of the same year, five helicopters and three 
airplanes were turned over from the U.S. to the Mexican government.137  Attorney 
General Franco Rodriguez expressed his most profound gratitude for this act and the 
ceremony in which it was carried out.  He concluded his remarks by taking satisfaction in 
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the joint drug efforts as they have given him and other Mexicans an opportunity to 
develop close and lasting friendships with their American counterparts. 
Mexico was a significant battlefield and provided international origins to Nixon’s 
war on drugs.  In September 1970, President Diaz Ordaz commented on Operations 
Intercept and Cooperation in his official “Report to the Nation.”  In summing up he stated 
that Mexico faced the problems caused by Operation Intercept with “firmness and 
equanimity, and the United States Government, after the first few days of unilateral 
action, also sought, as we did, to reach an administrative agreement which was signed on 
October 10, 1969.”  The president added, “Through it, Operation Intercept was replaced 
by Operation Cooperation, and we both agreed to continue, in our mutual interest, our 
fight against the illegal production, traffic and use of narcotics.”  He concluded the report 
by reminding his people that, “The U.S. government promised to modify its inspection 
procedures and Mexico reaffirmed its intention of intensifying its own fight against those 
criminal activities that cause so much harm to humanity, and in recent years, to our 
youth.”138  
The Nixon administration claimed its diplomacy with Mexico to be effective in 
that it incited government leaders into committing more resources to a concerted drug 
eradication and enforcement policy.  Operation Intercept was replaced with Operation 
Cooperation and eventually led to Operation Condor a few years later, which included a 
defoliation campaign using the toxic "Paraquat" herbicide.  Thus, Nixon’s limited drug 
war resulted in limited success, but it would lead to a much more elaborate effort on both 
the national and international level. 
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It should be noted that the problem relating to the illicit traffic in heroin and other 
drugs is the unifying theme that each facet of illicit drug traffic provides vast profits for 
each successive criminal involved.  That universal fact is so obvious that it is often 
overlooked, but as cabinet secretary Elliot Richardson noted in his April 2, 1970 speech 
to the Philadelphia Bar Association, drug profits are astronomical.  At the time Nixon’s 
administration began investigating current trends, 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) of morphine 
base was worth about $350 in Turkey.  After conversion into heroin in France it’s worth 
increased ten times that much.  When it arrived to New York via Mexico and other 
smuggling routes, street value jumped up to $25,000 and by the time heroin was diluted 
and reached the pusher the original amount of narcotic could amount to as much as one 
quarter of a million dollars.139  With so much potential for drug traffickers to rake in cash 
due to incredible profit margins, the White House would have to look beyond Turkey, 
France, and Mexico to effectively stop the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. 
Nixon’s Anti-Drug Diplomacy Extended to Other Nations   
 The Nixon administration identified Turkey, France, and Mexico to be top 
priorities during the origins of the war on drugs, but there were also other nations prior to 
1971 who were persuaded to join the fight against illegal narcotics trafficking.  As 
pressure mounted against France to crack down on the smuggling of illegal substances, 
neighboring Germany became an alternative route.  Thousands of American military 
service members stationed in Germany provided another factor in making the drug 
problem more of a threat as increasing numbers of troops became infatuated with 
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narcotics and dangerous drugs.  Shortly after returning from talks in the United States, 
Germany’s Interior Minister Genechar announced on July 19, 1970 that leaders reached 
an agreement on the exchange of personnel and that the two nations would cooperate in 
efforts to control drug abuse.  Nine days later Germany made public the details of a 
program of intensified efforts to control the misuse of drugs within the country.140  
 Iran was another nation affected by the Turkish-French connection.  Any study of 
international problems of drug abuse, production controls, and illicit trafficking must 
include awareness of the importance of Iranian narcotics production and markets.  During 
the 1970s, Iran was one of the limited numbers of nations licitly producing opium.  At 
that time there were approximately 350,000 opium users and addicts, which made Iran 
the largest world market and net importer (about 250 tons annually) of illicit opium.  Iran 
actually surpassed the United States with an estimated 50,000 people within their borders 
addicted to heroin.  When Iran banned poppy cultivation entirely in 1969, Turkey, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan became the main sources for fulfilling Iran’s continued 
demand for opium.  During 1970 when the Turkish government significantly restricted 
the number of farmers growing opium poppy, the percentage of raw opium smuggled in 
from Afghanistan jumped from 45% to 90%.141 
 Iran’s narcotics situation was directly impacted by Nixon’s foreign policies and 
Turkey’s decision to join the fight against drugs.  The Nixon administration fostered ties 
with the Iranian shah by discussing global anti-narcotics initiatives while remaining 
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sensitive Iran’s lucrative oil interests.  Fortunately for Nixon, a new Iranian narcotics law 
went into effect in 1969 and contained stiff penalties for those apprehended while 
smuggling hard narcotics and thus dampened the enthusiasm of Turkish and Iranian 
smugglers.  At the same time Turkish authorities yielded to American demands and 
increased law enforcement measures as part of their U.S.-backed anti-narcotics program.  
A similar case did not occur in Afghanistan.  In addition, the Turkish-Iranian border 
surveillance accord was signed in 1970 and led to greater cooperation between the two 
countries, thus increasing the hazards of smuggling from Turkey into Iran.   
 The Nixon administration did not have to focus on Iran as much as Turkey, 
because the Shah turned out to be much more self-motivated and aggressive in response 
to restricting illegal drug trafficking.  On February 16, 1970, Iranian authorities seized a 
total of 876 Kilos of opium from two separate groups of Afghan smugglers.  In one 
group, two members were arrested while the other ten fled after a firefight.  Two days 
later Iranian armed forces mounted an attack on a suspected smuggling camp in Myami-
Heights near the Afghan border.  The engagement became a gun battle that lasted all 
night long.  By the morning seven Afghan-nationals had been killed and eight wounded.  
Fifteen smugglers managed to escape across the border, but left behind their horses, 
weapons, and 1,300 Kilos of opium.  Only one member of the Iranian Gendarmerie was 
reported to be in critical condition as result of wounds suffered during the battle.  Another 
Iranian narcotics offender was shot dead after conviction by military tribunal reportedly 
for possession of more than 1,000 Kilos of opium smuggled from Afghanistan.  
According to the U.S. Embassy, this particular incident brought the total to sixteen people 
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executed under the new anti-drug law had passed almost one year earlier.142  Although 
Iran did legally cultivate opium poppy, the Nixon administration was not as concerned 
because the country tightly controlled cultivation and blocked any leakage into illicit 
international channels.143    
 Officers from the U.S. embassy and BNDD visited Rangoon, Burma to extend 
President Nixon’s desire for their cooperation in the U.S. Government’s campaign to 
reduce mounting drug abuse and to inhibit the illicit international drug traffic.  Shortly 
after the meeting Burmese news articles ran stories to make it appear like the government 
was taking action to step in line with international sentiments on the subject of drug 
trafficking.  Burma would prove to be a challenge for those interested in fighting the 
illicit drug trade.  It would not be until June 1974 when the Southeast Asian country 
would sign a bilateral drug control agreement with the United States.  Once reached, 
however, the State Department delivered twenty-five helicopters and five transport 
aircraft to help the Burmese military destroy poppy fields, attack drug refineries, and 
disrupt opium caravans.  Whether or not these arrangements worked as planned to reduce 
the amount of exported contraband remains the subject of vociferous debate. 
What remains certain is that international origins of Nixon’s drug war developed 
from the earliest days of his presidency.  Candidate Richard Nixon had promised to 
address the issue of narcotics and dangerous drugs as part of tackling America’s crime 
problem.  The president backed up his campaign rhetoric with action, precisely because 
he realized that in order to project American interests abroad, the nation needed to 
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resolve its challenges at home.  Thus, foreign policy and domestic concerns were 
intricately intertwined.  Nixon’s keen interest in foreign affairs extended to the initiatives 
he supported to address international narcotics control.  Beginning in 1969, the 
administration was very pro-active in combating narcotics abuse and illicit drug 
trafficking.  The National Security Council was tasked to devise new policies to curb the 
drug trade, and the White House accepted a wide array of recommendations.  The 
problems associated with unilateral action manifested itself in Mexico during Operation 
Intercept, but the drastic measure proved Nixon was serious about making the drug issue 
a high priority.  Congress subsequently realized the White House really wanted to 
achieve substantial anti-drug law reform, and 1970 proved to be a legislative success for 
all parties.  Operation Intercept immediately ushered in foreign cooperation alternatives, 
and bilateral actions with France, Turkey, and Mexico can be marked as three 
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Chapter 4: Nixon’s Total War on Drugs, 1971-1973 
President Richard Nixon declared total war on drugs after being criticized by the 
media and members of Congress for not doing enough to combat reported narcotics abuse 
among U.S. troops deployed overseas.  In other words, Americans’ anxieties about their 
boys becoming addicted drug junkies while fighting in Vietnam became the catalyst that 
propelled a domestic nuisance back home into a global crisis that required a large 
national and international response.  On June 17, 1971, the President held a White House 
press conference immediately following his Special Message to the Congress on Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control.  Nixon declared to the nation, “America’s public enemy 
number one in the United States is drug abuse.  In order to fight and defeat this enemy,” 
he said, “It is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.”144 
Nixon escalated his anti-drug initiatives to the administration’s highest priorities 
and adopted a public policy that relied upon a strategy with many parts:  First, 
international supply reduction of the narcotics and dangerous drugs that made their way 
to America; second, law enforcement enhancement in order to reduce crime associated 
with drug use; third, prevention of non-users from becoming future drug abusers and 
addicts; fourth, treatment and rehabilitation of those individuals who became addicts.  
President Nixon termed drug abuse as “our most vicious and debilitating social problem” 
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and designed a massive federal program in order to destroy the issue in the United States 
as quickly as possible.145 
Virtually all-historical accounts of Nixon’s drug control policy emphasize its 
narcotics abuse treatment, prevention, and law enforcement programs.  I argue in this 
section that the farthest-reaching component of the president’s strategy was international 
supply reduction.  On all the issues Nixon fought, he was most capable in the foreign 
policy arena, and since the catalyst for America’s new all-out offensive on drug abuse 
had germinated overseas, foreign affairs most affected its evolution. 
The Southeast Asian Drug Connection Was Initially a Low Priority 
Nixon devoted the majority of his time during the early years of his presidency to 
managing an honorable withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.146  Paradoxically, the 
White House initially placed Southeast Asia as a lower priority than France and Mexico 
when the Nixon administration first identified global sources of America’s drug 
problem.  Alexander Haig’s 1969 memo about heroin assessed 80% of the narcotic 
entering the U.S. annually to come from France, 15% from Mexico, and 5% from 
Bangkok and Hong Kong.147  Approximately one year later, Haig (who later served as 
Nixon’s White House Chief of Staff during the Watergate Investigations and Reagan’s 
first Secretary of State) drafted a sensitive TOP SECRET report, which identified drug 
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abuse among American forces in Vietnam to be pervasive.  “The problem,” he wrote, 
“should be susceptible to positive command action and not become a factor in troop 
level decisions.”148  The document cites a sharp increase in the proportion of troops who 
arrived to Vietnam with some previous drug experience: 12% in 1968, 27% in 1969, and 
50% in 1970.  Government officials simply ignored increasing trends of drug exposure 
to U.S. troops and recognized statistics as a reflection of the shifting national norm.149  
U.S. policy-makers also ignored the growing GI drug problem because they 
viewed fighting Communism a higher priority than stopping the Asian drug trade.  The 
Executive branch had long tolerated South Vietnamese officials’ deep involvement in 
drug trafficking, because it relied on these stable regimes to cooperate with larger 
national interests.  America’s prime concern during the Cold War was to defeat 
Communism by supporting cooperative regimes; yet Washington failed to control all 
questionable activities of its allies, especially those in Southeast Asia.  It is ironic that 
while Nixon attempted to control the spread of socialism and global drug trafficking, 
CIA officers cultivated relationships with anti-Communist forces that happened to also 
be intricately involved in the transnational illicit-narcotics trade.  Alfred McCoy, J.R.W. 
Professor of history at the University of Wisconsin—Madison, has written extensively 
about CIA involvement in the drug trade.  He argues that the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s ties to drug trafficking were not a result of corruption.  Unlike other national 
intelligence services, the CIA did not involve itself directly in the heroin trade to finance 
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its covert operations.  Rather, the CIA’s role was an inadvertent but almost inevitable 
consequence of Cold War tactics.150   
The CIA’s clandestine resistance against America’s enemies depended on air 
logistic routes between Laos and South Vietnam.  In return for cooperation, U.S. 
officials turned a blind eye towards corrupt leaders engaged in nefarious contraband 
running schemes.  The agency held prime responsibility for the Laotian war front and 
publicly denied any knowledge of complicit drug traffic.  However, the U.S. Bureau of 
Narcotics identified Laos’s General Ouane Rathikone-- Army chief of staff and a 
valuable asset in the fight against Communism-- as a factory owner of some local heroin 
refineries.  The CIA allowed tribal commanders to use planes and helicopters that 
belonged to Air America, a CIA-operated airline, to collect opium from highland 
villages and fly it to drug labs and black markets in Laos and South Vietnam.151   
Large quantities of cheap, high quality heroin flooded into Saigon beginning in 
May 1970, and South Vietnam soon after became a central target for rapidly increased 
hard drug usage among American GIs.152  Alexander Haig’s report stated, “It appears 
that no serious attention was given to the drug problem in Vietnam until July, 1970, and 
we are now at a stage where the magnitude of the problem is still being defined.”153  
During the Christmas season, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
launched its first Drug Abuse Suppression Program.  In January 1971 MACV and the 
U.S. BNDD sponsored a joint conference with Vietnam officials to develop control 
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programs.  As a result, American advisors were able to assist on every level to 
effectively take over direct supervision of the Vietnamese narcotics control effort.  
National police achieved many narcotics confiscations and arrests over the course of a 
three-month suppression campaign, but drug usage by U.S. military forces showed no 
significant decline.154   
Historian Jeremy Kuzmarov argues in his book, The Myth of the Addicted Army, 
that reports about drug abuse among U.S. soldiers deployed overseas were exaggerated 
and hyped for political gain.  However, Kuzmarov acknowledges that McCoy’s study 
should rightfully be considered a classic in the field of international narcotic control.  A 
mountain of evidence has corroborated his work over time.155  In 1972, an internal CIA 
study expressed “concern” that “local officials [with] whom we are in contact have been 
or may still be involved in one way or another in the drug business.”  The report 
concluded, “What to do about these people is a particularly troublesome problem in 
view of its implications for some of our operations, particularly in Laos.”156       
McCoy’s research-- conducted as a Yale graduate student in the early 1970s-- 
informed members of Congress and the media about Vietnam’s heroin connection.   
When international criminal syndicates responded to increased law enforcement efforts 
in Europe and the Middle East, they shifted major sources of narcotics to Southeast 
Asia.  The opium poppy fields of the region’s “Golden Triangle” became the new supply 
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of raw materials for secret heroin labs in Hong Kong and the Tri-border area where 
Burma, Thailand, and Laos converge.157  BNDD Director John Ingersoll reported that 
his intelligence sources indicated much of the massive flow of narcotics that moved 
through Latin America into the United States came from Southeast Asia.  McCoy 
testified of the evolving commodity chain before a U.S. Senate Subcommittee and added 
that the country’s Southeast Asian allies profited greatly from this “heroin bonanza.”158 
Drug Abuse in Vietnam was a Catalyst for New Presidential Action 
 
Shrewd FBN director Harry Anslinger utilized 1950’s hysteria over the belief 
Communist states had masterminded drug trafficking into American cities as a weapon to 
weaken its Western foes.  Now a new generation of drug warriors relied upon anti-
Communist sentiments to justify the activities of their respective branches of government.  
National defense leaders General William C. Westmoreland, Victor “Brute” Kulak, and 
CIA operative Edward Lansdale asserted Communist agents in North Vietnam and China 
imported narcotics and then pushed the contraband as covert acts of sabotage via guerilla 
insurgents to American forces stationed overseas.  Their motives were not to simply 
make money, but more to discredit opposing forces and use the GI drug problem for 
propaganda purposes.159 
Although many journalists based their speculations on public claims, the Nixon 
administration privately rejected assertions about illicit exports from Communist China.  
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Secretary of State William Rogers sent a confidential AIRGRAM to the American 
Embassy in Rangoon that confirmed the accuracy of intelligence sources.  “Washington,” 
he concluded, “sees no confirmed evidence that Communist China is illicitly exporting 
opium or its derivatives across her borders.  Despite occasional reports indicating cross-
border movement of opiates between Communist China and Southeast Asia, the 
relatively rigid governmental controls existent in mainland China would seem to preclude 
any significant illicit cross-border movements.”160 
Media depictions of surreptitious Asians peddling highly toxic substances to 
virtuous American youth stoked the bothersome myth of an addicted army.  While the 
clandestine CIA connection to anti-communist groups remained a critical component to 
drug smuggling in Southeast Asia, a barrage of news articles and special reports 
highlighted the corrupting influence of war and drugs on brave American youth.  New 
York Times writer Gloria Emerson informed readers about the popularity of “Scag,” a 
highly purified form of heroin that could be smoked.  “It is so easy to buy heroin from 
peddlers in Vietnam wherever there are American troops or convoys,” she reported, “that 
a tiny plastic vial can be purchased for $3 outside the headquarters of an American 
general.”161  Proliferation of the narcotic was linked to corrupt foreign vendors, and on 
May 16, the Times ran a screaming front-page expose, “GI Heroin Addiction Epidemic in 
Vietnam.”162  The news conveyed alarm at the ease with which heroin circulated through 
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the Army’s ranks and the prospect of thousands of addicts returning home with cravings 
for drugs that were exponentially more costly in the U.S. than overseas.   
Shocking depictions of drug use fit into an orientalist discourse similar to what 
America had experienced in the late nineteenth century.  Perceived backward qualities of 
East Asian culture reflected the corrupting foreign influences on virtuous American 
youth.163 Newsweek put an emaciated veteran junkie on its cover under the headline, “The 
Heroin Plague: What Can be Done?”  The lead story was about the spread of addiction 
from “the back alleys of Long Binh and Saigon” to “Middle-American towns and 
neighborhoods.”  The authors insinuated, “Heroin has exploded on us like an atom bomb.  
Ten years ago, even three years ago, heroin was a loser’s drug, an aberration afflicting the 
blacks and longhaired minorities.  Now all this has changed.  Nice Jewish boys are 
coming out of the woodwork as well as Mormon kids, Japanese Americans and all other 
exemplars of hard-working middle-class ideals.”164  
Constituents alarmed by the impressions they received about America’s addicted 
army flooded their representatives’ offices with phone calls and mail.  Senators and 
congressmen then sent letters of inquiry to the White House, State Department, and 
Pentagon.165  Everybody wanted to know if the reports were true, and if so, how long had 
the Defense Department known, and what was being done to solve the crisis.  These 
letters exemplified the heightened public alarm that was shaped in large part by the tone 
of mass media.  The perception that drug abuse represented a vital threat to America’s 
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national security inundated all those following the news and led them to believe the 
greater hazard to health and safety of their children was not military combat, but 
becoming addicted to hardcore drugs.166 
News reports of addiction among U.S. troops did more than arouse public interest.  
Media and government attention to rampant drug abuse in Vietnam instilled a sense of 
urgency within the Nixon administration to combat the heroin epidemic.  In April 1971, 
two congressman, Robert Steele, a Republican from Connecticut, and Morgan Murphy, a 
Democrat from Illinois traveled to South Vietnam on behalf of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee.  Upon their return, Steele, a former CIA man, visited the White House to 
brief Bud Krogh and Alexander Haig.  The representative said he believed ten to fifteen 
percent of all GIs in Vietnam were addicted to Heroin, and that it was not just the war 
effort that was at stake.  He expressed concerns about the tens of thousands of 
withdrawing troops who would bring home drug habits and cause a surge in demand to 
satisfy their cravings, which would undoubtedly lead to another uncontrollable national 
crime wave.167  Nixon dispatched Robert H. Finch and Donald Rumsfeld, counselors to 
the President, on a twenty-three day trip to Europe and North Africa to discuss drug 
abuse prevention and control with foreign officials.  The two held a news briefing on the 
trip on May 21 and essentially re-affirmed what the other congressmen had said.168    
The World Heroin Problem was the spark that ignited political controversy and 
instigated Nixon’s response to wage total war on drug abuse.  Composed by Chairman 
Murphy and Congressman Steele, this forty-six-page document submitted on May 27, 
                                                
166 Ibid. 
167 Massing, The Fix, 107. 
168 Richard Nixon, “The President’s News Conference,” June 1, 1971.  Online by Gerhard Peters and John 
T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3031 
 
 58  
1971 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee estimated that between 25,000 and 37,000 
(15%) of GIs had become addicted to heroin.  The number was later revised to around 5 
percent, but the congressmen made their point to colleagues and fellow Americans: drugs 
were crippling America’s ability to effectively wage and win war in Vietnam.  The 
report’s wording was blunt.  “Bribery and corruption at the highest official levels in 
Southeast Asia left little room for hoping that the heroin traffic could be halted in the near 
future.”  The congressmen declared that an effort had to be made to stop the traffic but 
concluded, “If these efforts fail, the only solution is to withdraw American servicemen 
from drug Southeast Asia.”169 
The White House was annoyed by inflated rhetoric and misinformation contained 
in the report and the sustained media attention it received.  Murphy and Steele included 
outlandish claims there was an organized effort by black veterans to flood the country 
with heroin.170  On the week of the special study mission’s release, the New York Times 
featured Steele in a blown-up photograph with a vial of heroin in his left hand, which was 
intended to broadcast the easy availability of the substance and the seminal threat that it 
represented to Americans.171  The Pentagon fired back at Congressional accusations 
before the White House even had a chance to coordinate an elaborate response. 
Television’s evening news was filled with coverage of Deputy Secretary of Defense 
David Packard’s directive to military leaders that they immediately come up with a 
solution to the heroin problem in the Services, because it is obvious the White House did 
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not have any way to deal with the issue.  Annoyed, Nixon’s domestic policy advisor John 
Erlichman called Henry Kissinger and complained that “Packard has galloped into the 
arena and is going to solve it.”  The National Security Advisor offered to “shut him up,” 
and said, “I don’t know the details, but the President has to get credit for that and you 
can’t go out preempting it.”  Kissinger was successful in hushing the Pentagon and 
reported back to Erlichman that, “Dave is a decent guy.  All these other guys are 
barracudas but Dave does not mean any harm.”172 
The Nixon administration sought to quell criticism about the drug problem by 
coordinating buildup to a stupendous announcement about a new White House strategy.  
Bud Krogh rushed to obtain final review of the 1971 World Opium Situation Report, put 
together by White House Interagency Working Group Task Force on Heroin.  This report 
countered the Murphy-Steele special mission study and became a valuable resource 
document for official use within the Executive Branch, the Congress, and Foreign 
Services.  The study estimated world illicit production, consumption and trade in opium 
and its derivatives, to characterize the organization of the illicit traffic and to define in 
general terms the problems involved in controlling these activities.  Prepared jointly by 
the BNDD and the CIA from available information (The CIA requested to state the report 
was prepared jointly by both BNDD and CIA), the scope and quality of the information 
provided mostly tentative estimates and findings. 
Nevertheless, the White House Task Force believed the time was right for its 
wider distribution as a resource document within the executive and legislative branches.  
The study represented a first attempt to view problems of opium-based drug abuse on a 
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comprehensive scale and from an international point of view.  Chairman of the 
Interagency Working Group, Harvey R. Wellman, hoped this report would stimulate the 
kind of critical and informed comment that would promote refinement and updates as 
time went on.  Krogh used the study after its dissemination to justify $150 million of the 
federal budget for Jerome Jaffe’s Methadone program.173 
Nixon presented a formal response to the Murphy-Steele study and pledged to 
give the drug problem his highest priority.  On June 1 the president promised to 
undertake a “national offensive” to counter the problem of drug addiction among young 
Americans, including servicemen who have become addicted while in South Vietnam.  
“We are going to give it the highest-priority attention at all levels,” he said.”174  For 
Nixon, the issue of addiction among returning combat veterans was only part of the 
overall problem.  Now that Congress had grown a desire to support government steps 
towards helping drug addicts recover, the White House could successfully push forward a 
four-front national program the president described as the following: 
First, the front of getting at the sources.  This means working with foreign 
governments where the drugs come from, including the Government of South 
Vietnam, where they have, of course, a special responsibility.  It means, also, 
prosecuting those who are the pushers. It means, in addition to that, a program of 
treating the addicts, and that, incidentally, insofar as veterans are concerned, 
means treating them where they are addicted to heroin or hard drugs before 
releasing them, giving them the opportunity. And, finally, it requires a massive 
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program of information for the American people with regard to how the drug 
habit begins and how we eventually end up with so many being addicted to 
heroin, the hard drug, which virtually is a point of no return for many.175 
 
Following his remarks, the president subsequently met that same week with the 
Secretary of Defense, the three Service Secretaries, the three heads of the armed services, 
in order to receive direct reports on the programs they had initiated at the administration’s 
suggestion.  U.S. ambassadors serving in Turkey, France, Mexico, and other countries 
associated with international illicit narcotics trade traveled back to Washington to discuss 
the development of a new comprehensive drug control policy.  Nixon insisted that he 
considered drug abuse the highest priority, and promised to ensure the issue would 
receive attention at all levels, not just with regard to veterans, where it was a special 
problem, but nationally, where it concerned everyone. 
June 17, 1971—Nixon Declared America’s War on Drugs 
 
 I have argued that international origins of Nixon’s drug war formed long 
before the thirty-seventh president entered the White House.  His administration began 
pushing forward anti-drug initiatives immediately upon taking office.  In May 1971, Bud 
Krogh assessed their efforts up to that point in a memo to his boss and said: 
The President, on many occasions, has declared that solutions to problems 
of drug abuse have no higher priority in his Administration.  But the reality is that 
much more needs to be done to bring about substantively effective programs in 
rehabilitation, prevention and research.  Law enforcement and diplomatic 
overtures to other countries—Turkey, France, and Mexico—have all been 
effective, but more here needs to be done.176 
  
Nixon astutely timed the announcement of his new counter drug offensive.  The 
                                                
175 Richard Nixon, “The President’s News Conference,” June 1, 1971.  Online by Gerhard Peters and John 
T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3031 
176 Egil “Bud” Krogh, “White House memo from Bud Krogh to John Erlichman, May 14, 1971,” Epstein 
Papers; cited in Massing’s, The Fix, 108. 
 
 62  
middle of June, 1971 marked two momentous events that left a fateful mark on the Nixon 
White House legacy: Mr. and Mrs. Nixon gave their daughter Tricia’s hand in marriage; 
and the next day news about the leaked Pentagon Papers instigated the President’s 
obsessive interest in the matter.177  When attention surrounding the Murphy-Steele Report 
and Pentagon Papers leak threatened the administration’s Vietnam policy and made 
Nixon seem obtuse about the drug problem, Nixon desperately sought something to 
change the course of his dismal summer.   
In the middle of all the commotion, President Nixon made a major progressive 
announcement.  On June 17, 1971 he met with a bipartisan delegation at the White House 
to present his Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.  
“The laws of supply and demand function in the illegal drug business as in any other,” he 
said.  “We are taking steps under the Comprehensive Drug Act to deal with the supply 
side of the equation and I am recommending additional steps to be taken now. But we 
must also deal with demand. We must rehabilitate the drug user if we are to eliminate 
drug abuse and all the antisocial activities that flow from drug abuse.”178  This new 
approach to rehabilitation addressed the magnitude of the problem, the national and 
international implications of the problem, and the limited capacities of States and cities to 
deal with the problem, which all combined to reinforce his conclusion that coordination 
of the government’s efforts had to take place at the highest levels of the Federal 
Government.   Nixon related the drug epidemic to dimensions of a national emergency 
and asked Congress for an amendment to the 1972 budget in order to provide an 
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additional $200 million to take steps away from drug abuse.  Once passed, the federal 
budget allocated $371 million for programs to control drug abuse in America.179  Part of 
these funds paid for the establishment of a new central authority with overall 
responsibility for all major Federal drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, 
rehabilitation, training, and research programs in all Federal agencies.  Nixon urged the 
Congress to give his proposal the highest priority.  Nevertheless, due to need for 
immediate action, he issued an Executive Order [11599] to establish within the Executive 
Office of the President a Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP). 
President Nixon appointed Dr. Jerome Jaffe to be the nation’s first head of 
SAODAP and act immediately as America’s drug czar.  Unlike former FBN 
Commissioner Harry Anslinger, Jaffe focused on combating America’s demand for drugs 
and coordinated the activities of nine federal agencies concerned with rehabilitation, 
education and research.  SAODAP also directed compulsory urinalysis screening of all 
veterans that returned from Vietnam and organized a compulsory detoxification and 
treatment program for those found to have taken drugs.  Under presidential order, 
discovered addicts deployed with the military overseas were held for as much as thirty 
days beyond their normal discharge date.180  Michael Massing’s The Fix provides an in-
depth look of SAODAP and Dr. Jaffe’s great nation-wide experiment with methadone 
treatment for heroin addiction.181For Jaffe, Nixon’s remarks in the White House press 
room on June 17, 1971 introduced the young thirty-seven year old professor of psychiatry 
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from the University of Chicago to the public spotlight and effectively made him the 
general responsible for protecting America’s domestic front in the ensuing war on drugs. 
President Nixon’s new all out offensive in the war on drugs also provided more 
resources for additional needs on the law enforcement front.  The White House asked 
Congress to provide legislation, which permitted the United States Government to utilize 
information obtained by foreign police, provided that such information was obtained in 
compliance with the laws of that country.  Other new legislation requested permitted a 
chemist to submit written findings of his analysis in drug cases and thereby sped up the 
process of criminal justice.   
$2 million of the drug war budget went to the research and development (R&D) 
of new equipment and technologies for the detection of illegal drugs and drug traffic, 
while another $2 million was allotted to the Department of Agriculture for R&D of 
herbicides used to destroy growths of narcotics-producing plants without adverse 
ecological effects.  John Ingersoll’s Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs received 
325 additional positions, which increased capacity to apprehend those engaged in 
narcotics trafficking within U.S. borders and abroad.  Finally, Nixon asked the Congress 
to provide supplemental appropriation of $25.6 million for the Treasury Department to 
reach a total of $45 million.  This measure enhanced customs and border protection by 
simply doubling the amount of funds available to use for drug abuse control.182 
Nixon’s requests eventually led to Executive order [11641], which established the 
Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE).  The new initiative marshaled a 
wide range of government resources—granted by the Organized Crime Control Act of 
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1970—in a concentrated assault on the street level pusher.  Myles Ambrose had 
overcome the controversial fallout he left after commanding Operation Intercept and was 
chosen by Nixon to be ODALE’s first man in charge.  Under his direction, the new 
agency worked through nine regional offices to pool new information concerning drug 
traffickers for use by Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.  ODALE drew 
from the Departments of Justice and Treasury to assist American communities detect, 
arrest, and prosecute heroin traffickers.183    
President Nixon’s biggest front in the new all-out offensive in the war on drugs 
was international supply reduction.  “To wage an effective war against heroin addiction,” 
he said, “we must have international cooperation.”184  In order to secure such 
cooperation, the President of the United States initiated a worldwide escalation in 
existing narcotics traffic control programs and proposed a number of new steps for this 
purpose.  The first step was to recall U.S. Ambassadors to Turkey, France, Mexico, 
Luxembourg, Thailand, the Republic of Vietnam, and the United Nations for 
consultations on how to better cooperate with other nations in the effort to regulate 
substantial world opium output and narcotics trafficking.  Nixon sought to make it 
equally clear that he considered the heroin addiction of American citizens an international 
problem of grave concern to their nation and instructed Ambassadors to make his 
message clear to their respective host governments.185 
Nixon’s second step consisted of a meeting in Bangkok, Thailand for all U.S. 
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Ambassadors to East Asian governments, where they reviewed the increasing narcotics 
problem in the region, with a particular concern for the effects of drug abuse on 
American servicemen in Southeast Asia.  Third, the president proposed an international 
goal to end production of opium and the growing of poppies worldwide.  Since opium is 
legitimate source of income to many producing nations, and morphine and codeine both 
have legitimate medicinal applications, this step seemed insurmountable.  Still, Nixon 
hoped the development of effective substitutes for medical derivatives would eliminate 
any valid reason for opium production. 
The president requested $1 million as the fourth step in the international front to 
be used by BNDD for training foreign narcotics enforcement officers.  This increase of 
global interaction and exchange enhanced foreign relations and developed partnerships to 
help combat transnational illicit trafficking.  As a fifth step, Nixon asked the Congress to 
amend and approve the International Security Assistance Act of 1971 and the 
International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act of 1971.  Both permitted 
assistance to proscribed nations in their efforts to end drug trafficking. “The drug 
problem crosses ideological boundaries and surmounts national differences,” he stated.  
“If we are barred in any way in our effort to deal with this matter, our efforts will be 
crippled, and our will subject to question.” The president intended to leave no room for 
other nations to question America’s commitment to this matter.186 
Sixth, Nixon declared the United States must recognize that cooperation in control 
of dangerous drugs works both ways. While the sources of America’s chief narcotics 
problem are foreign, the U.S. was also a source of illegal psychotropic drugs, which 
afflicted other nations.  Nixon explained that, “If we expect other governments to help 
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stop the flow of heroin to our shores, we must act with equal vigor to prevent equally 
dangerous substances from going into their nations from our own.”187  Accordingly, he 
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, a UN treaty recently signed by the United States and 22 other nations.  In 
addition, Congress was warned any legislation made necessary by the Convention 
including the complete licensing, inspection, and control of the manufacture, distribution, 
and trade in dangerous synthetic drugs would be submitted. 
Seventh, the President followed up on a $2 million pledge to a special fund 
created on April 1, 1971 by the Secretary General of the United Nations aimed at 
planning and executing a concerted UN effort against the world drug problem.  Nixon 
maintained the United States would continue its strong backing of UN drug-control 
efforts and encouraged other countries to contribute.  Finally, Nixon urged multilateral 
support for amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotics, which enabled the 
International Narcotics Control Board to achieve a global consensus on the restriction of 
opium growing and prohibition of other dangerous substances. 
For Nixon, narcotics addiction was a problem that afflicts both the body and soul 
of the nation.  He believed it was a problem, which baffled and frightened many 
Americans.  “For those who become victims of narcotics and dangerous drugs,” he said, 
“It is a problem which demands compassion and not simply condemnation.”188  
Beginning in the days of the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon promised to do 
more to combat America’s drug problem.  While in office, the thirty-seventh president 
succumbed to many faults and blunders but managed to deliver on addressing the 
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narcotics and crime issue.  Ironically, Nixon supported international narcotics control all 
along, but it was the political controversy and hysteria brought on by reported heroin 
addiction within America’s military that became a catalyst for the consummate politician 
to be able to launch a new all out offensive against drug abuse.  
The International Community Responded to Nixon’s War 
 
President Nixon’s mid-June press conference announced his new all-out offensive 
against drug abuse and identified heroin as public enemy number one.  The international 
community realized America was serious about narcotics control and many countries 
decided to publicly join Nixon’s war.  Iranian leadership shared the president’s deep 
concern for eradicating illicit drug trafficking.  Like the United States, Iran viewed itself 
as a narcotic drug victim during the years of Nixon’s drug war and took many similar 
steps to combat drug abuse (i.e. Strong anti-smuggling laws, rehabilitation programs, 
upgraded training for narcotics law enforcement officers).  Although Iran did legally 
cultivated opium poppy, the Shah reassured Washington its program was tightly 
controlled.  The American Embassy in Tehran did not see any leakage of Iranian 
production into illicit international channels.189  In return for good relations, the U.S. 
State Department facilitated an exchange of five UH-1 “Huey” helicopters to enhance the 
Iranian Government’s helicopter narcotics control program that were then used to control 
the remote Eastern frontier with Afghanistan over which large quantities of illegal open 
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were being smuggled into Iran.190 
Mexico continued to berate the effects of Operation Intercept but still promised to 
consider carefully any suggestions Nixon administration officials had for improved 
performance by its Latin partners.  Foreign Secretary Rabasa asked the U.S. Ambassador 
if his president had raised any particular problems about U.S.-Mexican cooperation in the 
drug question.191  The answer was no, but the administration did inquire about the 
possibility of holding a public delivery ceremony of three helicopters to Mexico later that 
summer.  On August 11, 1971, the first of many turnover ceremonies was held after U.S. 
pilots flew three helicopters into Ciudad Juarez and transferred custody over to the 
Mexican government.  Following the ceremony, officials from both countries witnessed 
the burning of two tons of marijuana.192  In addition to rotorcraft, Mexico’s Federal 
Judicial Police requested an long wish list of items it could use affectively in its anti-drug 
efforts to include: ground transport equipment, additional fixed wing and rotary aircraft, 
communications gear, and weapons and ammunition.193 
Nixon’s drug war also extended to Africa.  On July 12, 1971, Ghana’s 
government launched a government campaign against the use of two dangerous drugs 
that posed a particular concern to its nation: cannabis and amphetamines.  New 
publications like Ghana’s Health Digest discussed the background to the production of 
Indian hemp, which was popularly known in the West African country as “wee.”  The 
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article also outlined the extent of Indian hemp ingestion, the background of consumers 
and their motivations, and the legal, social, and preventative aspects of the problem.  
Ghana’s Minister of Health appealed to his countrymen to report cases of drug use to the 
police or hospitals and called on judges to impose heavier penalties on hemp smokers and 
dealers.194 
Nixon Created the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control 
 
 Nixon was the first president to elevate America’s drug problem to the 
foreign policy level and take personal initiatives to solicit the cooperation of other 
governments.  His diplomatic efforts aimed to persuade each nation to do its share and 
meet its responsibilities in the worldwide war against drug abuse.195  The president called 
for an accelerated attack on the international aspects of the narcotics trade in his message 
to the Congress on June 17, 1971, when he stated, “No serious attack on our national 
drug problem can ignore the international implications of such and effort, nor can the 
domestic effort succeed without tackling the problem on an international plane.”196  
Nixon’s call resulted in the establishment of the Cabinet Committee on International 
Narcotics Control (CCINC) on August 17, 1971.  Members were announced at the White 
House three weeks later on September 7 and included: Secretary of State William Rogers, 
Attorney General John Mitchell, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Secretary of 
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Treasury John Connelly, Jr., CIA Director Richard Helms, and US Representative to the 
UN George Bush.  Nixon added Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin on October 1 
after the president became interested in potential parasites and other herbicides he was 
told could potentially destroy drug crops at their source.197  The CCINC was responsible 
for the formulation and coordination of all U.S. Government policies that related to the 
goal of curtailing and eventually eliminating the flow of illegal narcotics and dangerous 
drugs into the United States.198  The Committee was specifically charged with developing 
comprehensive plans and programs for international drug control; assuring the 
coordination of all diplomatic, intelligence, and Federal law enforcement programs and 
activities of international scope; evaluating all such programs and activities and their 
implementation; making recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget on 
proposed findings; and providing periodic progress reports to the President.199  
Although the full committee did not meet often, its working group provided high-
level personnel from each of the member agencies plus the Special Action Office for 
Drug Abuse Prevention.  CCINC Executive Director “Bud” Krogh of the White House 
staff worked diligently as the working group chairman and coordinated with State 
Department’s Nelson Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for 
International Narcotics Matters.  Together these two directed the preparation of Narcotics 
Control Action Plans for fifty-nine countries considered to have a current or potential 
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involvement in the production, processing, consumption, or transshipment of illicit hard 
drugs.   
A bureaucratic army of Foreign Service employees provided Krogh and Gross 
with the troops needed in to effectively accomplish the CCINC’s mission to attack the 
global front of Nixon’s drug war.  Personnel from various government agencies including 
BNDD, Customs, CIA, Agency for International Development (AID), and State were 
assigned to embassies around the world.  To complement the mobilizing resources from 
Washington, narcotics control coordinators were designated at virtually all-foreign posts.  
Regional teams collaborated to focus on illicit commodity chains connected to their 
respective areas of interest.200  France was the European hub, because intelligence 
indicated that country was where most of the world’s heroin refining was done.  Thailand 
was the Asian hub, and Iran served as the regional marshal for the Middle East.  South 
America’s center was in Paraguay, since the CCINC found it to be where narcotics were 
historically most often smuggled in and out.  Each embassy also submitted its own action 
plan to restrict narcotics destined for American black markets or U.S. personnel abroad. 
The action plans included a description of the drug situation in the country in question, a 
statement of goals, and a strategy to achieve such goals, estimated costs, priorities, and a 
general timetable for implementation.  After review and approval in Washington, the 
action plans were forwarded to Foreign Service posts to serve as a basis for opening 
discussions with host governments for the negotiation of bilateral narcotics control 
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agreements or programs.201 
Nixon directly charged each American Ambassador with the ultimate 
responsibility of developing, implementing, and monitoring CCINC approved action 
plans.  Their credibility was enhanced with personal letters from the White House Nixon 
sent out to the chiefs of counter narcotics missions in sixty-nine countries.  “A successful 
fight against drug abuse will require the cooperation of all nations,” he said.  “For this 
reason I have made effective narcotics control a primary foreign policy objective of the 
United States.”202  As the State Department’s senior adviser and coordinator for 
international narcotics matters, Nelson Gross led other administration officials in the 
attempt to convey to foreign governments and to overseas diplomatic missions the 
determination of the United States to take the necessary steps in cooperation with others 
to bring narcotics and other dangerous drugs under effective control. 
Krogh magnified his duties as CCINC Executive Director, although some 
representatives from DoD, CIA, and Treasury lacked his same amount of enthusiasm.  
For example, the White House fired off multiple memos to the Pentagon expressing 
frustration about the extremely “unimaginative” and “parochial” attitude of the Defense 
representatives.  Krogh reiterated that, “The Cabinet Committee Working Group is a 
policy setting body which requires a DOD spokesman who can commit the Department.  
Ben Foreman does not have the requisite drive or authority.”  In another paragraph he 
wrote, “The Coordinating Subcommittee must be an aggressive, enthusiastic group 
capable of reconciling interagency differences, making policy recommendations, and 
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supervising the Government-wide anti-drug effort.  As a GS-14 (Government Service 
Employee pay grade level 14) expert on European military sales, Mr. Leo Carl possesses 
neither the attitude nor the stature necessary to be an effective Defense representative.203 
1972: A Year of International Narcotics Control Success 
 
Despite interagency personnel challenges, the Nixon administration claimed the 
Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control was an effective use of the new 
resources that were allocated to fight the global war on drugs.  Substantial agreements to 
enhance international narcotics control and restrict global supplies of illegal drugs were 
achieved between the United States Government many other countries.  In addition to 
Turkey, France, Mexico, Germany, Iran and Ghana, leaders of Japan, South Korea, India, 
New Zealand all cooperated with Nixon’s global narcotics control initiatives.204  The 
president specifically mentioned the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics 
Control during his 1972 State of the Union Address205 and shared success stories with the 
public throughout the year.  No doubt he had duplicitous intentions.  Success stories were 
not only popular with the press, but they also boosted his public approval ratings leading 
up to the November elections. 
France served as the perfect kind of victory Nixon desired.  The president 
attended a CCINC meeting at the White House on March 18, 1972 and shared SECRET 
information that just two days earlier French authorities had affected the world’s largest 
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heroin seizure (937 pounds) on a shrimp boat in Marseilles.206  This news arrived shortly 
after France seized five heroin labs during a major drug racket crackdown.  Then on April 
10, Philip D’Antoni’s The French Connection swept five Oscars at the Academy Awards 
in Hollywood.207   
Panic in Needle Park208 was another movie released in 1971 about the drug 
problem but received hardly the same recognition.  Al Pacino’s stark portrayal of life 
among a group of heroin addicts who hang out in "Needle Park" in New York City did 
not demand the same record breaking number of ticket sales as Gene Hackman’s raw 
performance of a NYPD detective willing to chase international drug runners and 
“frogmen” past the point of recklessness.  This cultural contrast also reflects the reality 
that Nixon’s international component of the drug war was more compelling and popular 
with the general public than the domestic component. 
The White House ensured drug warriors successful in France also received 
personal acknowledgment of their achievements.  Mr. Paul Knight represented BNDD at 
the American Embassy in Paris and received a personal letter of appreciation signed by 
Richard Nixon.  “The Regional Office in France of the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs has been playing a central role in the global war against heroin, and 
your leadership in this effort has been outstanding.”  Nixon added, “On behalf of every 
American who is deeply concerned about the menace of drug abuse, I welcome this 
opportunity to express my appreciation for all you and your colleagues are doing.”  The 
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White House distributed many similar thank you notes throughout the year.209   
Nixon enjoyed other countries’ success stories during 1972.  The Turkish ban on 
opium cultivation was implemented resolutely, though Turkish officials faced sharp 
domestic criticism.  Mexico’s $51.3 million wish list for material and training was 
approved.  Thailand burned twenty-six tons of opium on March 7 and then arrested the 
notorious ex-GI heroin trafficker, Lawrence W. Jackson.  The CCINC achieved a 
milestone when authorities successfully extradited and convicted key drug kingpin 
Auguste Ricord.210  Nelson Gross traveled down to Paraguay and dealt with the head of 
state in a way that justified a lot of diplomacy and a great deal of money in order to 
persuade the government to turn him over to U.S. custody.  The extradition of Ricord was 
significant.  First, it put all drug conspirators on notice that the United States was 
relentless in tracking down those who trafficked in drugs.  Second, it was a signal to 
governments around the world that America wanted co-operation with its allies.211  
Critique of Nixon’s Drug War Strategy 
 
Despite the administration’s positive rhetoric and captivating case studies, 
Nixon’s drug war was not without criticism.  America’s attention turned back again to 
Southeast Asia during the summer of 1972 when Alfred McCoy testified before a Senate 
Subcommittee about the Federal government’s involvement in the Southeast Asia 
narcotics trade.  He concluded: 
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After spending eighteen months researching, travelling and conducting 
hundreds of interviews, I have reached one firm conclusion—if we are going to 
deal seriously with the heroin problem in this country we will have to reorder our 
priorities and commitments in Southeast Asia.  President Nixon has told us that 
we cannot solve the drug problem unless we deal with it at its source and 
eliminate illicit opium production.  The source is now Southeast Asia, and that 
area accounts for some 70% of the world’s illicit opium supply.212  
  
Nelson Gross offered a counter testimony and said, “All officials concerned with 
the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding 
from President Nixon, have begun an intensive effort to stem the international narcotics 
traffic.”  The New York Times published a column by Seymour Hersh containing 
references to CONFIDENTIAL CIA reports that concluded, “Contrary to the Nixon 
Administration’s public optimism, there is no prospect of stemming the smuggling of 
narcotics by air and sea in Southeast Asia.”213  McCoy and Congressman Steele were the 
two leading critics of Nixon’s drug war strategy and alleged the Government to be lax in 
its prosecution of corruption.  The cabinet level report referred to was prepared for the 
CCINC and recommended the suppression of illicit traffic by Thai trawlers appeared 
“both feasible and highly rewarding; it should clearly command highest priority.”  The 
seizure of one trawler would have been a real victory, because in one form or another, a 
trawler load represented an estimated 6% of annual U.S. heroin consumption.214  Policy 
makers responded to the report and by the time McCoy published his book in July 1972, 
the Southeast Asia situation had changed.  Current information from the Office of the 
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CIA Deputy Director/ Intelligence remarked, “Much has occurred since the 21 February 
report in the way of taking or stimulating concrete actions against the weaknesses 
described in the report of 21 February.”215 
President Nixon responded to criticism of his global war strategy and continued to 
warn other nations not to assist drug traffickers move dangerous drugs into the United 
States.  All along the campaign trail, Nixon defended his administration’s achievements 
in the fight against narcotics and drug abuse.  Senator McGovern echoed the McCoy-
Steele allegations and said, “We have allied ourselves with corrupt governments that are 
complicit in the drug trade and this fact is coming home to haunt us.”216  Without 
mentioning his political opponent’s name, the President underscored his Administration’s 
commitment to the campaign against drug abuse and explained how he detested drugs 
being pushed into the country.  “I consider keeping dangerous drugs out of the United 
States as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States.”217  
Ten days before the Presidential election, Nixon released a campaign statement about 
crime and drug abuse to remind voters the issue remained one of his administration’s 
highest priorities.  “As a result of our total war on drug abuse,” he claimed, “the rate of 
growth in new heroin addiction has declined dramatically since 1969.”  Nixon concluded, 
“By winning the war on crime and drugs, we can restore the social climate of order and 
justice which will assure our society of the freedom it must have to build and grow.”218 
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President Nixon voiced a new call to action in the global war on drugs when he 
attended the Washington Conference on International Narcotics Control.  This three-day 
event was the first worldwide meeting of senior U.S. narcotics control officials.  Fifty-
nine representatives from fifty-four American embassies abroad plus the country’s 
diplomatic mission to Geneva traveled from their respective posts located across the 
globe to convene at the U.S. State Department building.   
Nixon considered the Conference as important as any other he ever attended.  For 
him, winning the battle against drug abuse was the most important and most urgent issue 
of the day.  “As President of the United States,” he reminded the audience, “I feel that I 
bear no more solemn trust than to help to win this battle, and as public officials, 
everybody in this room, people who represent America in this country and all over the 
world, you could not be engaged in a finer humanitarian cause than in winning this battle 
against drug abuse.”219 
The President used inciting rhetoric to rally support and enthusiasm for his anti-
drug initiatives.  In rousing fashion, Nixon concluded remarks to narcotics control 
officials by saying: 
 We are living in an age, as we all know, in the era of diplomacy, when 
there are times that a great nation must engage in what is called a limited war.  I 
have rejected that principle in declaring total war against dangerous drugs.  Our 
goal is the unconditional surrender of the merchants of death who traffic in 
heroin. Our goal is the total banishment of drug abuse from American life. Our 
children's lives are what we are fighting for.  Our children's future is the reason 
we must succeed.  We are going to fight this evil with every weapon at our 
command, and, with your help and the support of millions of concerned 
Americans, we are going to win.220 
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 The Washington Conference highlighted key players in Nixon’s drug war 
and validated the work of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control.  
Secretary of State and CCINC Chairman William Rogers, Nelson Gross, and Bud Krogh 
preceded the President’s keynote address.  The balance of the conference was conducted 
in closed session that allowed experts to share self-assessments and deliberate 
constructive criticism.  Conferees heard reports from Washington program officials and 
participated in individual regional workshop meetings, where they discussed situations in 
Latin America, Europe, Africa, the Near East and South Asia, and East Asia and the 
Pacific.  The final day was devoted to conclusions and conference recommendations for 
improving the effectiveness of international narcotics control.  
The Golden Triangle 
 
After the Washington Conference, Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle became a 
new target in the U.S. drive to halt drug traffic.  Poppy fields of Burma, Thailand, and 
Laos were the world’s largest single source of illicit opium during Nixon’s war.  The 
region produced about 700 tons a year.  Of this, about 600 tons were used in Southeast 
Asia, while the remaining 100 tons—enough when refined into heroin to supply U.S. 
addicts for a year—moved into international drug traffic.   
Burma was the “real source of production,” when it put out about 500 tons of 
opium annually.  The state was controlled at that time by tribal groups the Burmese 
government was unable to discipline.  Burma refused to let U.S. narcotics agents into the 
country to combat opium production and traffic until finally an agreement was reached in 
1974.  Thailand was mainly a transit country.  The Government cooperated closely with 
the United States, and allowed American agents to train foreign partners how to interdict 
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drug flow out of Burma, particularly from Tachilek, major processing center.  Laos also 
cooperated with the United States to block transshipment of opium and heroin from 
producing and processing centers in Burma.   
South Vietnam was the biggest market for heroin, but as the numbers of U.S. 
servicemen declined, so did demand for drugs.  With an overwhelming supply and lack of 
demand, pushers had to find new markets to sell their black market commodities.  
Bangkok, Singapore, Saigon, Hong Kong, and Manila all became narcotic dispensing 
centers, and some dealers figured out how to ship their product all the way overseas 
directly into the United States.221 
The Nixon Administration realized, after spending its first two years focusing on 
Mexico, Turkey, and France, that the drug problem was not something that could be 
handled on a limited basis.  Potential profits from the illegal sale of narcotics were so 
high, that even if victories were achieved in one area, traffic moved some place else.  Bud 
Krogh attributed this phenomenon to the “balloon effect.”  When the government 
squeezed pressure on one side, the balloon bulged out on the other.222   
In 1972 the CCINC worked to develop a worldwide control infrastructure, 
recognizing that it took time before countries could become proficient at narcotics law 
enforcement.  International drug control officers believed the trafficking patterns that 
emerged in Southeast Asia would sink to the same level they had witnessed in Europe but 
only after a sustained period of persistent involvement in the region.  With most of 
America’s forces removed from Vietnam, authorities zeroed in on the attacking the 
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Golden Triangle. 
Nixon’s Final Message to Congress on Law Enforcement and Drug Abuse Prevention  
 
President Nixon devoted his final message to the Congress on the state of the 
Union to reviewing the progress he felt his administration had made on law enforcement 
and drug abuse.  No single law enforcement problem occupied more time, effort and 
money in the years of Nixon’s presidency than that of drug abuse and drug addiction. 
Nixon repeatedly stated that he regarded drugs as "public enemy number one,” because 
he believed they destroyed the nation’s most precious resource--its young people--and 
bred lawlessness, violence and death.223 
When the Administration assumed Office in 1969, only $82 million was budgeted 
by the Federal Government for law enforcement, prevention, and rehabilitation in the 
field of drug abuse.  By 1974 that figure had increased to $785 million--nearly 10 times 
as much.  Nixon put a positive spin on the change when he said, “Narcotics production 
has been disrupted, more traffickers and distributors have been put out of business, and 
addicts and abusers have been treated and started on the road to rehabilitation.”224  
According to official statistics, heroin supplies on the East Coast did in fact substantially 
decrease.  The scarcity of heroin in America’s big Eastern cities drove up the price of an 
average "fix" from $4.31 to $9.88, while at the same time its purity dropped from 6.5 to 
3.7 percent.  Nixon claimed this trend encouraged more addicts to seek medical treatment 
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and use the methadone facilities his administration helped to create.225 
Through the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, Nixon argued 
Embassy action plans helped fifty-nine foreign countries develop and carry out their own 
national control programs.  These efforts, linked with those of the Bureau of Customs and 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, produced heartening results for the 
Administration.226  Prime Minister Erim decided in 1971 to prohibit all cultivation of 
opium within Turkey’s borders.  Worldwide narcotics seizures almost tripled in 1972 
over the previous year, and seizures by U.S. anti-narcotics allies abroad reached an all-
time high by 1973.   
Among the many reports about the drug war shared with Congress and the 
American people, Nixon most touted those related to international affairs as evidence of 
his successful strategy.  This included the half-ton of heroin on a shrimp boat headed for 
the United States that was seized in 1972 by French authorities.  Argentine, Brazilian and 
Venezuelan agents also seized 285 pounds of heroin in three raids the same year.  Twenty 
arrests crippled the French-Latin American connection.  Paraguay Ringleader Auguste 
Ricord was extradited to the U.S. by Paraguay and sentenced to 20-years in Federal 
prison.  Thailand's Special Narcotics Organization seized a total of almost eleven tons of 
opium along the Burmese border, as well as a half-ton of morphine and heroin.  Iran 
scored the largest opium seizure on record--over 12 tons taken from smugglers along the 
Afghanistan border.  These results were all the more gratifying for Nixon in light of the 
fact that heroin was wholly a foreign import to the United States.  We do not grow opium 
or produce heroin here, he said.  “Yet we have the largest addict population in the world. 




 84  
Clearly we will end our problem faster with continued foreign assistance.”227 
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Chapter 5: Nixon’s Drug War Changes, 1973-1974 
 
President Nixon overwhelmingly defeated Senator George McGovern in the 1972 
Presidential election.  The campaign victory was like a touchdown produced in part from 
the all-out offensive strategy against drug abuse that he initiated in June 1971.  However, 
once re-elected, the President’s national drug control policy began to change and 
emphasized the need for more support of law enforcement measures. 
Rockefeller’s Drug Laws Emphasized Harsh Punishments 
 
New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s mandatory sentencing laws profoundly 
affected President Nixon’s drug war.  During the early years of the Nixon administration, 
Rockefeller championed White House sponsored drug prevention programs and 
rehabilitation policies.  Late in 1972 however, he unexpectedly did an about face after 
studying Japan’s war on drugs and the effectiveness of its zero-tolerance policy.  “For 
drug pushing,” he said, “life sentence, no parole, no probation!”228  Joseph Persico, one 
of Rockefeller’s closes aides, said Rockefeller suddenly decided that more progressive 
approaches to drug addiction had simply failed.229  During a press conference in January, 
the governor launched his new campaign to toughen New York’s laws.  He called for 
mandatory prison sentences of fifteen years to life for drug dealers and addicts—even 
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those caught with small amounts.  “I have one goal and one objective,” he stated, “and 
that is to stop the pushing of drugs and to protect the innocent victim.”230 
The Rockefeller drug laws served as a model for the nation.  His new initiative 
was so popular in New York that the state legislature was quick to come on board.  The 
idea of getting tough spread across America and soon many states joined New York by 
adopting their own mandatory minimum sentences and three-strike rules.  Rockefeller’s 
draconian drug laws contributed to an explosion in the prison population from 330,000 in 
1973 to a peak of 2.3 million.  Hundreds of new state and federal prisons had to be built 
to house the influx of inmates.231 
The federal government took notice of New York’s Rockefeller drug laws and 
also contributed to rises in the prison population.  Richard Nixon relied on Nelson 
Rockefeller’s support during the 1972 Presidential election.  The Governor even headed a 
New York State Committee to Reelect the President.232  In return, President Nixon visited 
the Empire State many times and observed the impact Rockefeller’s drug laws had on the 
drug war.233  On March 14, 1973, Nixon’s State of the union message to the Congress 
laid out a request for harsh mandatory sentencing laws.  These measures elevated 
Governor Rockefeller’s initiatives to a federal level.  President Nixon believed federal 
sentencing practices were so inadequate and intolerable, that he proposed legislation to 
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increase punishments for heroin and morphine offenses.  To be sure judges applied these 
tough sentences, Nixon mandated no penalties could be lessened nor probation granted.  
Nor did he allow those trafficking in heroin or morphine to be released before their trials.  
Nixon acknowledged that these were harsh measures, but insisted that circumstances 
warranted such provisions.234 
The media questioned President Nixon’s policy change.  Two days after his State 
of the Union message, the President held a press conference at the White House Rose 
Garden.  A reporter wanted to know why the President supported restoration of 
mandatory prison terms for narcotics traffickers.  Just three years prior, the Chief 
Executive signed a bill into law that removed mandatory prison terms from narcotics 
convictions.  Now he had done a complete turnaround on this policy issue.  In response, 
Nixon pointed out mandatory sentences only applied to crimes associated with hard 
narcotics, not soft drugs like marijuana.  During the sixties, the United States went far 
down the road of the permissive approach to those charged with a crime.  Nixon argued 
that America reaped a terrible harvest, which he described as the greatest increase in 
crime that the country had ever seen, explosive to the point where law and order became 
a great concern in the 1968 elections and again in 1972.  Under these circumstances, 
Nixon believed that it was essential not to use a permissive approach, but one where the 
penalties deterred the crimes.  President Nixon opposed the legalization of marijuana, yet 
he also advocated an equitable punishment to fit the offense.235 
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The principal shift toward a heavy law enforcement strategy occurred when the 
White House transmitted Reorganization Plan Number Two of 1973.   On March 28, 
1973, Nixon asked the Congress to create a single, comprehensive Federal agency within 
the Department of Justice to streamline the Federal drug law enforcement effort and lead 
the war against illicit drug trafficking.  Funding for this effort had increased sevenfold 
during the previous five years, from $36 million in fiscal year 1969 to $257 million in 
fiscal year 1974--more money was not the most pressing enforcement need.  Nor was 
there a primary need for more manpower.  Under the Nixon administration, Federal drug 
enforcement agencies (BNDD, ODALE, Customs Bureau) received a total of over 2,100 
new agents-- an increase of more than 250 percent above 1969 levels.236 
The enforcement work could benefit significantly, however, from consolidation of 
America’s anti-drug forces under a single unified command.  In 1973, the Federal 
Government fought the war on drug abuse under a distinct handicap, for its efforts were 
those of a loosely confederated alliance facing a resourceful, elusive, worldwide enemy.  
Nixon said Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan described this handicap precisely when the 
master naval strategist wrote, "Granting the same aggregate of force, it is never as great 
in two hands as in one, because it is not perfectly concentrated."237  In other words, the 
President sought to consolidate power and grant all significant drug war prosecution 
authority to one agency under the watchful eye of the Justice Department.    
Nixon issued Executive Order 11727, which established the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and authorized the U.S. Attorney General to coordinate all activities of 
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the executive branch departments and agencies directly related to the enforcement laws 
respecting narcotics and dangerous drugs.238  The DEA endured Nixon’s drug war and 
emerged as one of its lasting legacies. 
Nixon Created a New Federal Drug Team 
 
Nixon’s war changed when he created a new Federal drug team after his initial 
generals in charge left their positions.  On February 2, 1973 Bud Krogh turned over his 
duties as Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control 
and became Undersecretary of Transportation.  Following Nixon’s successful re-election, 
Bud felt a great desire to leave the White House and serve in one of the departments far 
removed from law enforcement, narcotics control, or clandestine activity.239  Three 
months later he resigned his post and claimed full responsibility for coordinating the 
break-in to the offices of Dr. Lewis J. Fielding (Daniel Ellsberg’s Psychiatrist).  On 
November 30, 1973, Egil “Bud” Krogh pled guilty to a single charge in violation of 18 
U.S.C. 241, conspiracy to violate civil rights.  In January, the following year, a Federal 
judge sentenced him to a prison term of two to six years with all but six months 
suspended.240 
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The State Department also experienced turnover.  Ambassador to Turkey William 
J. Handley left his Embassy post on April 19, 1973.  He returned to Washington and 
replaced Nelson Gross as Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for 
International Narcotics Matters.241  Handley had been in the forefront of the international 
narcotics control program from its inception and played a key role in the negotiations that 
led to Turkey’s ban on opium cultivation.242 
Nelson Gross left the Nixon Administration in May 1973 after being indicted on 
five-tax fraud and perjury counts.  These charges stemmed from his activities as chairman 
of William T. Cahill ‘s 1969 New Jersey gubernatorial campaign.243  Like Bud Krogh, 
Nelson Gross was released from Federal prison early after serving just over six months of 
what originally had been a two-year sentence for campaign-finance abuses.244  Gross left 
politics and became a wealthy owner of a converted ferryboat restaurant in New Jersey.  
The millionaire vanished in 1997 after withdrawing $20,000 from a bank near the 
restaurant and his law office.  Nelson Gross was last seen driving off with two men in his 
1990 grey BMW sedan.  Police found his body one week later slashed and bludgeoned on 
the east bank of the Hudson River.  As a sad twist of fate, they made the discovery only 
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after an antidrug unit in Washington Heights, Manhattan received an informer’s tip that 
led to the capture of the murder suspects.245 
Dr. Jerome Jaffe’s resignation also changed Nixon’s drug war strategy.  Jaffe was 
the main figure who developed the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.  By 
its definition, SAODAP’s purpose was to prevent drug use and treat addicts.  Methadone 
clinics were built all over the country under Jaffe’s tenure, but when the emphasis shifted 
to law enforcement, SAODAP’s role declined.  The physician grew frustrated and was 
constantly add odds with other members of the administration who wanted him to be a 
better team player and supporter of the burgeoning Drug Enforcement Administration.  
Jaffe resisted, and submitted his letter of resignation to the President on May 29, 1973.  
Two weeks later he stepped down as the nation’s drug czar, and Dr. Robert DuPont took 
his place.  SAODAP phased out and was replaced with its successor, the National 
Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA).   Unlike Jaffe’s SAODAP that was located two hundred 
steps from the White House, NIDA moved to DC’s suburbs in Rockville, MD, buried 
deep within the Health, Education, and Welfare Department building.  While Congress 
did not cut the Federal treatment budget, few NIDA initiatives were undertaken.  Robert 
DuPont confessed, “We lost our momentum.  The priority and focus of the issue 
declined, and so the game became holding on, rather than expanding.”246 
Krogh’s staff director, Walter Minnick, attempted to infuse some of his 
predecessor’s enthusiasm into Nixon’s new Federal drug team.  He requested the 
President meet individuals recently appointed to head three major components of the 
                                                
245 Dan Barry, “Youths Accused of Killing New Jersey Millionaire,” The New York Times, September 25, 
1997.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/25/nyregion/youths-accused-of-killing-new-jersey-millionaire.html 
246 Massing, The Fix, 130-134. 
 
 92  
national drug control effort.247  The appointment was brief, to the point, and held just 
before Nixon introduced the three experts to an audience assembled in the White House 
East Room for the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime Conference.248  Ambassador 
William J. Handley explained the international component, Dr. Robert DuPont discussed 
new dynamics of drug treatment, and John Bartels presented himself as first nominee to 
head the newly created DEA. 
International Partners Changed Policies 
  
The new triad enjoyed immediate success.  In August 1973, the Nixon 
Administration celebrated the capture of Lo Hsing-Han, one of the most infamous drug 
traffickers in the world at the time.  His arrest represented a major step in the fight against 
an increasing influx of heroin into the U.S. from Southeast Asia.  Burmese officials 
proved their willingness and ability to move against narcotics trafficking insurgents who 
previously roamed freely throughout the countryside.  Secretary of State Rogers boasted 
about the international narcotics control program when he said, “Though it utilizes less 
than ten percent of the Federal drug funds, it has been a major factor in inducing the 
current shortage of heroin on the East Coast.”249   Ambassador Handley then traveled to 
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Burma in the middle of winter January 1974 and motivated the Government to cooperate 
internationally within the limits of its non-aligned policy.250  
Meanwhile, just as Nixon’s drug war gained ground in Burma, battles were lost 
elsewhere.  On July 1, 1974, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit’s coalition cabinet voted to 
rescind the ban on cultivation of opium poppy, which had been imposed by a military-
backed government three years earlier.  Turkey was formerly the main source of illegal 
heroin for the U.S. market.  In lifting the ban, Ankara disregarded warnings that the US 
Congress might cut off aid.  Prime Minister Ecevit had been motivated by domestic 
pressures to lift the ban.  During campaign season the previous October, both parties that 
formed the governing coalition promised such action, and since then most other major 
party leaders had also come out against the ban.  With new elections on the horizon, 
support of peasants in the poppy-growing areas seemed necessary for the delicate balance 
that presently existed among Turkey’s political parties.  Turkey’s poppy repeal was a 
hard blow for the administration, which by then had become completely covered in 
clouds of controversy associated with the Watergate scandal.  Congress demanded a firm 
response.  The President worked through his National Security Council and conveyed all 
foreign aide money to Turkey cease due to their non-compliance to international 
narcotics control agreements.  
The Watergate Drain 
 
By far, Watergate was the largest drain on Nixon’s drug war, because it involved 
key players and distracted the administration’s focus.  On July 15, 1971, John Erlichman 
assigned Bud Krogh to handle a matter that “had been deemed of the highest national 
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security importance by the president,” and it did not have a thing to do with narcotics 
control.251  Bud was tasked with finding out who leaked the sensitive Pentagon Papers 
and to prevent any further disclosures of national security from occurring.  He began 
coordinating the White House Special Investigations Unit (SIU), or “Plumbers” as it 
came to be known.  G. Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt had contributed to the war on 
drugs but were then tasked to support Krogh in his special assignment.  Certainly these 
“special” activities deterred from productive service in executing the President’s national 
drug control policy. 
Nixon’s new emphasis on zealous law enforcement coincided with controversy 
over Watergate.  In July 1973, he concluded a press conference in the White House Rose 
Garden by defending his tenacity and said,  
Well, now, just so we set that to rest, I am going to use a phrase that my 
Ohio father used to use. Any suggestion that this President is ever going to slow 
down while he is President or is ever going to leave his office until he continues 
to do the job and finishes the job he was elected to do, anyone who suggests that, 
that is just plain poppycock. We are going to stay on this job until we get the job 
done. 
 
Nixon then offered a long list of causes he believed his administration was elected 
to do.  Protecting young people from dangerous drugs was one those causes.  “And what 
we were elected to do, we are going to do,” he huffed, “and let others wallow in 
Watergate, we are going to do our job.”252  Unfortunately for Nixon, he had to face the 
reality of his situation.  No matter how badly he wanted to keep going, the job he started 
did not get done.  On August 9, 1974,253 Richard M. Nixon resigned from the office of 
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the President of the United States.  As the disgraced leader boarded his helicopter and 
flew away, so too did passion and enthusiasm for an all-out, total war on drugs. 
  
 




 In this paper I have argued that Richard Nixon perceived the drug problem in the 
United States as not just a domestic issue, but also an international issue.  His reaction to 
narcotics and drug abuse stemmed from a backlash against the counterculture movement 
of the late 1960s.  For Nixon, most of these young people were naïve youngsters caught 
up in the hippie-drug scenes and anti-war protests of the day.  Some however, were 
victims of harmful foreign influences—mainly instigated by communists.   
 Nixon’s motives to fight drugs were consistent with other historical phases of 
hysteria the country experienced throughout its past.  California was the first state in the 
Union to enact anti-drug laws.  These measures were in direct response to Chinese-
American immigrants and the opium dens they operated.  Opium abuse contributed to the 
first national drug control laws.  The 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act regulated labeling of 
products containing certain drugs, which included cocaine and heroin.  The 1914 
Harrison Narcotics Tax Act was much more direct in its regulatory language.  This same 
law led to the creation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.  Headed by ardent drug 
warrior Harry J. Anslinger, the FBN led the charge against Mexican-American 
immigrants and their perceived marijuana madness.  Due to convincing testimony by 
Commissioner Anslinger and his allies, Congress passed the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act.  
During the 1950s Anslinger played off of fears about communism and supported the 
harsh 1956 Narcotic Control Acts.  He also became heavily involved in U.S. interests by 
working with the United Nations.  The 1961 Convention on Narcotics was not a perfect 
drug control treaty, but it did affect the flow of marijuana.  
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 Upon taking office, President Nixon pro-actively sought to combat narcotics 
abuse and illegal drug trafficking.  He tasked the National Security Council with devising 
policy options that addressed the drug problem.  He also delegated authority to young-
capable staff assistants he could place trust in to help lead new initiatives.  These advisors 
offered foreign cooperation alternatives, which led to direct involvement with the 
governments of Turkey, France, and Mexico.  Nixon’s staff also assisted him to marshal 
high priority legislation through the stifling halls of the United States Senate and House 
of Representatives. 
 Nixon declared a new all-out offensive against drug abuse after he received 
criticism for not doing enough to address the narcotics problem and treat the addicted 
army in Vietnam.  I have argued that reported widespread drug abuse in Southeast Asia 
was the catalyst that launched Nixon’s declaration of war against drug abuse and heroin 
on June 17, 1971.  The White House devised a national drug control strategy that 
consisted of many parts.  Dr. Jerome Jaffe’s Special Action Office for Drug Abuse 
Prevention took on the domestic fight against demand for narcotics.  His methadone 
clinics provided a network needed to provide hardcore addicts with increased access to 
prescribed treatment.  Federal Law Enforcement was another main part of the President’s 
national strategy.  Myles Ambrose led this charge with the Office of Drug Abuse Law 
Enforcement. Abuse.  The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control 
rounded out the strategy and was Nixon’s most extensive component.  Secretary of State 
William Rogers chaired the CCINC, but Bud Krogh operated as Executive Director.  This 
body oversaw the intricacies of Nixon’s drug war and devised policies that were sent out 
around the globe.  Due to a full concerted effort, 1972 proved to be the most successful 
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year for international narcotics control and benefited Nixon’s presidential re-election 
campaign.  
 Nixon’s drug war changed over time.  Beginning in 1973, Nixon’s total war 
shifted to a heavy emphasis on drug law enforcement.  One can clearly see the change 
over time by reviewing two separate meetings, which represent opposite ends of the 
treatment vs. enforcement scale.  During his remarks at the 1969 Opening Session of the 
Governors' Conference, Nixon told all the states’ Governors in attendance with their 
families that he thought what they were about to hear would be the most effective 
presentation on narcotics and dangerous drugs they had ever heard.  When it was time to 
conclude, Nixon stood and said: 
I have learned a lot in these presentations. I must say that when they first 
started, I thought the answer was more penalties. I thought that the answer was 
simply enforce the law and that will stop people from the use of drugs. But it is 
not that.  When you are talking about 13-yearolds and 14-year-olds and 15-year-
olds, the answer is not more penalties. The answer is information. The answer is 
understanding.254 
Four years later, under the pressures of performing a job in the face of 
scandalous allegations and ceaseless investigations, Nixon’s emphasis on the need for 
information and understanding had changed.  The President it seems, reverted back to 
calling for more laws and harsher punishments.  New penalties for narcotics trafficking in 
1974 provided minimum three to fifteen year Federal sentences for a first offense, and ten 
to thirty years for the second offense.  This proposal enabled judges to deny bail and 
                                                
254  Richard Nixon: "Remarks at the Opening Session of the Governors' Conference at the Department of 
State.," December 3, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2353 
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require the defendant to be brought to trial within sixty days.255 
 Despite Richard Nixon’s change over time and self-inflicted downfall, I maintain 
that the most significant and most extensive part of the President’s drug war was its 
international component.  His administration ventured all over the world and strived 
zealously to assess the drug problem, devise and implement the most suitable policies 
deemed practical, and then reassess and adapt to changes.  For this reason, I argue 
Nixon’s drug war belongs in the arena of his foreign policy achievements. 
  
                                                
255 Richard Nixon: "Special Message to the Congress Proposing Legislation To Control Drug Trafficking," 
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